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ARTICLES

MINIMUM FEES FOR THE SELF-EMPLOYED:
A EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE "UBER-IZED" ECONOMY?
Eva Grosheide
t
Mark Barenberg
Abstract
In advanced market economies in Europe and North America,
a large and growing percentage of the workforce is self-employed.
This group earns a contractualfeefrom clients, ratherthan a wage
or salary from employers, one form of the so-called "Uberization" of the labor market. Through an analysis of the Court of
Justice of the European Union's (CJEU) rulings, this Article
explores whether minimum fees for the self-employed could be
implemented without infringing European Union (EU) competition
law. In particular, it lays out four possible legal mechanisms
what the paper dubs "U-turns" that swerve around the social
harms of Uber-ization while maintaining its social benefits. The
first three are targeted at the CJEU's existing precedents. The
fourth is bolder and urges the Court to adopt concepts better
adapted to changing labor market conditions.
The Article concludes that the first U-turn concocting an
association of self-employed enterprises as a shield against
competition law is not promising as a general strategy. It could,
however, succeed in particular occupational contexts if the
association can prove that minimum fees directly promote the
proper practice of the occupation. The second U-turn adopting
minimum fees for the self-employed in a collective bargaining
agreement may succeed if employee associations are able to
prove that minimum fees are necessary to avert so-called "social
dumping" or "injurious competition, " although the Court has yet
to reach that precise question. The third U-turn fee-setting by
government bodies may be the most reliable, so long as the
officialfee-fixing body is careful to maintain its independencefrom
PhD candidate at the University of Amsterdam. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the
Labour Law Research Network conference in Amsterdam on June 27, 2015.
t Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia University, and Director of the
Columbia Program on Labor Law and Policy.
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self-interestedprivate associationsof the self-employed. The fourth
U-turn is the most compelling, albeit the most transformative. It
urges the Court to enrich its reasoning by drawing on the United
States (US) Supreme Court's concept of "labor group, " and by
permitting combinations of employee associations and selfemployed "labor groups" to set minimum fees unilaterally or
bilaterally. By adopting the intermediate category of "labor
groups," the CJEU would abate its rigid dichotomy between
"undertakings" and
"employees"
and would respond
constructively to the Uber-ized economy through the Court's
recent commitment to realist interpretive methods. This course
would achieve the proper balance between the EU's social and
economic policies.
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INTRODUCTION
Advanced market economies in Europe and North America face a shifting labor
market epitomized by the now-familiar business strategy of outsourcing. Firms
outsource work to independent enterprises, including to putatively "self-employed"
workers who are no longer deemed "employees" of the outsourcing enterprise. They
nonetheless provide labor services to the outsourcing firm.1 When work is
outsourced to the self-employed, employees earning wages or salaries are converted
into independent businesses earning "fees" from their "client" that is, from their
erstwhile employer. The proliferation of such arrangements has been labeled the

1 For

general treatments of these transitions in corporate form and labor market structure, see DAVID

WELL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE
DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014); Flexibility and Security in Temporary Work: A Comparative and European
Debate (Bruno Caruso & Silvana Sciarra, eds.) (Working Paper C.S.D.L.E. Massimo D'Antona INT
56/2007, 2007), available atlhttp://aei.pitt.edu/13694/1/caruso sciarra n56-2007int.pdf.
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"Uber-ization" of market economies, 2 referring to one paradigmatic, highly
controversial instance of the new labor market. The eponymous Uber corporation
has converted taxi drivers from employees of fleets regulated by taxi commissions,
to self-employed, casual free-lancers who connect with clients via Uber's
intermediation. The lion's share of self-employment has not yet migrated to the
internet. 3 The sharp rise in online intermediation of free-lance work across many
occupational categories has nonetheless drawn increased
legal and political attention
4
to the more general phenomenon of self-employment.
The traditional framework of labor legislation and regulation no longer reflects
the structure of labor markets. That framework centers around individual or
collective relational contracts between employer and employee, who presumptively
stand in relations of asymmetric bargaining power. The self-employed, standing
outside that regulatory framework, are deemed full-fledged enterprises and therefore,
5
in most countries, enjoy none of the labor protections afforded to employees.
Consider the most rudimentary form of labor protection. In most countries
employees enjoy the protection of minimum wages, whether set by statute or
collective bargaining agreements. Yet the self-employed, no matter how weak their
bargaining power relative to the corporations to whom they provide services, are
rarely protected by minimum fees. In the EU, the stipulation of minimum fees for the
self-employed seems to run head-on into the strictures of European competition law.
Since the self-employed are deemed independent enterprises or "undertakings,"
setting minimum fees among the self-employed appears, as a formal matter, to be
just another instance of illegal price-fixing among enterprises. 6 This Article explores
four legal strategies what we call "U-turns" for avoiding a collision between
minimum fees and this basic rule of competition law. The U-turns would preserve
8
the benefits of the Uber-ized labor market while ameliorating its social harms.
The first U-turn would be to concoct an association of self-employed enterprises
as a shield against competition law. This is not promising as a general strategy, but
might well succeed in particular occupational contexts if the association can prove
that minimum fees directly promote the proper practice of the occupation. The
second U-turn would entail adopting minimum fees for the self-employed in a
collective bargaining agreement. This strategy may succeed if employee associations
are able to prove that minimum fees are necessary to avert so-called "social
2
There's
an
App
for
That,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Jan.
3,
2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21637355-freelance-workers-available-moments-notice-willreshape-nature-companies-and; Noam Scheiber, Growth in the 'Gig Economy' Fuels Work Force
Anxieties, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/13/business/rising-economicinsecurity-tied-to-decades-long-trend-in-employment-practices.html.
3 On-Demand Workforce to Include 7.6 Million People By 2020, New Study Says, SILICONBEAT
(Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.siliconbeat.com/2015/08/13/on-demand-workforce-to-include-7-6-millionpeople-by-2020-new-study-says/ (last accessed Mar. 22, 2016) (on-demand economy predicted to
constitute 11 percent of total self-employed by 2020).
4 See infra, Parts II & IV.
' See infra, Part I.
6 See infra,
Part III.
7 See infra, Part IV.
' See infra, Part II.
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dumping" or "injurious competition," although the CJEU has yet to reach that
precise question. The third U-turn would require fee-setting by government bodies. It
may be the most reliable, so long as the official fee-fixing body is careful to maintain
its independence from self-interested private associations of the self-employed. The
fourth U-turn is the most compelling, albeit the most transformative. It urges the
Court to enrich its reasoning by drawing on the US Supreme Court's concept of
"labor group," and by permitting combinations of employee associations and selfemployed "labor groups" to set minimum fees unilaterally or bilaterally. By adopting
the intermediate category of "labor groups," the Court would discontinue its current
rigid dichotomy between "undertakings" and "employees." It would respond
constructively to the Uber-ized economy through the Court's recent commitment to
realist interpretive methods. It would also achieve the proper balance between the
EU's social and economic policies.
Part I sets out the fundamental legal distinction between "employees" and "the
self-employed." It also explains the key ways in which self-employment may
jeopardize various normative principles of EU social policy, including autonomy,
social welfare, equality, occupational integrity, and promotion of social dialogue.
Part II then explains the basic features of EU competition law that are most relevant
to the problem of minimum fees for the self-employed. Part III provides a survey of
empirical trends in self-employment across the Member States of the EU. Part IV
canvasses the four U-turns that advocates might pursue in order to implement
minimum fees and insulate such fees from attack under EU competition law. It
evaluates the likelihood that each strategy would succeed under existing doctrines of
the CJEU.It also offers normative guidance to the CJEU to interpret or modify its
doctrines to accommodate the kinds of fee-setting that are consistent with (i) core
principles embodied in relevant EU Treaties and CJEU precedent and (ii) the
realities of the contemporary labor market.
I. NORMATIVE PROBLEMS RAISED BY COMPETITION BETWEEN THE
EMPLOYED AND THE SELF-EMPLOYED
In the European context, the CJEU's judgment in Allonby provides a striking
example of the potentially severe consequences for workers who are converted from
"employed" to "self-employed" status.9 In that case, the Accrington & Rossendale
College dismissed a number of part-time lecturers due to the increased financial
burdens resulting from EU and United Kingdom (UK) legislation that required
employers to provide benefits to part-time workers equivalent to benefits paid to
full-time workers. The part-time lecturers were able to retain their work at the
College only if they registered with the Education Lecturing Service (ELS), an
agency that maintained a database of available lecturers. By registering at ELS,
however, the part-time lecturers became self-employed and therefore lost certain
benefits to which they were previously entitled as employees of the College. In
preliminary proceedings, the CJEU was presented with the question of whether
Article 141 of the EC Treaty (now Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union; hereinafter, TFEU), which requires equal pay between men and
9

Allonby v. Accrington & Rossendale Coll., Case C-256/01, EU:C:2004:18,

16 19.
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women for equal work, applies to two people working in the same establishment but
who have contracts with different employers. 10 In the Allonby case, some workers
remained "employees" of the College, while others became "self-employed"
providers of services through the intermediation of the ELS. This is a classic
instance of putatively self-employed enterprises that, in the US legal system, might
be deemed "independent contractors," "free-lancers," or "consultants." These classes
of worker are matched with clients or customers by temporary agencies or other,
increasingly web-based, intermediaries such as Uber.
The Court concluded that the equal pay provision applies only if the inequality
in pay is attributable to a single source.11 According to the Court,
a woman ... is not entitled to rely, vis-A-vis the intermediary
undertaking, on the principle of equal pay, using as a basis for
comparison the remuneration received for equal work or work of
the same value by a man employed by the woman's previous
employer. 12
Advocate General (AG) Jacobs, in his Allonby opinion, rightly focused on two
interrelated developments that increasingly characterize the contemporary labor
market and labor protection. 13
(1) that employers increasingly outsource to independent
contractors work that does not relate to the undertaking's core
business.
(2) that the classic employer-employee relationship is being
replaced by contractual relations between employers and
independent contractors.
AG Jacobs argued that these developments are not per se harmful from a social
point of view. They 1are,
however, problematic if they undermine or evade
4
employment protection.
Several potential economic benefits result from outsourcing and selfemployment. The outsourcing company may sharpen its focus on its core
competence. In economic parlance, there may be diseconomies of scope in a
corporation that integrates too many functions. 15 Governing economic transactions
by contracting across entities, each carrying out different phases of production and
distribution, may bear lower transactions costs than bureaucratic administration of
multiple functions within a single entity. 16 When formerly vertically integrated
companies disintegrate, they may be replaced by multi-firm ecosystems that allow
°Id.
Id.
12Id.

33, 39, 42.
46, 50.

50.

1 Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Allonby v. Accrington & Rossendale Coll., Case C-

256/01, EU:C:2003:190,
1

44.

Id. T45.

15 See, e.g., Evan Rawley & Timothy Simcoe, Diversification, Diseconomies of Scope and Vertical

Contracting:Evidencefrom the Taxicab Industry, 56 MGMT. SC. 1534, 1535 (2010).
16 See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
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more agile, productive, and innovative recombination of firms within supply chains,
production networks, or sectors.1 7 Competition for clients among the self-employed
or other independent contractors may improve the quality and lower the costs of
specialized or routinized tasks.1 8 The self-employed may gain greater flexibility in
their work schedules and greater autonomy through self-supervision. Consumers of
final goods produced or sold by the outsourcing companies may enjoy lower prices.
Those companies' shareholders may profit from lower-cost production throughout
the companies' upstream supply chains. Their employees may themselves, in some
instances, gain higher wages and greater decision-making responsibility through new
forms of team production. These new forms are made possible by the focus on core,
sometimes less routinized, functions. 9
These benefits, however, come with several potentially negative consequences.
In most European countries, the self-employed are subject to the general rules of
private law, in which freedom of contract is a core principle. The law deems
regulation of self-employed compensation as contrary to the freedom of contract.
The employer's sidestepping of labor-law obligations to those who provide labor
services is not the only potential harm. The conversion of "employees" into "the
self-employed" poses other dangers to autonomy, social wellbeing, distributive
justice, and professional integrity. These dangers implicate core principles enshrined
in EU Treaties and CJEU decisions.
When employees must compete with the self-employed who lack legal
protections, there is a substantial risk of what in Europe is dubbed "social dumping"
and in US jurisprudence is called "unfair," "injurious," or "ruinous" competition. 20
The self-employed may incur lower labor costs in two ways. They do not bear the
expense of labor protections. They also succumb to the frequent pressure to engage
in self-exploitation which can extend to their families. 21 In competitive response,
employees must reduce their wages or face loss of employment. The consequence is
the downward spiral of social dumping and injurious competition leading, in many
low-wage sectors, to outright non-compliance with employees' workplace rights and
standards.22
This phenomenon constrains not only the bargaining power and therefore
autonomy of the employees and the self-employed. It also constrains the autonomy
of employers that would prefer to afford higher standards to their employees. The
17 For a sectoral study, see Michael G. Jacobides, Industry Change Through Vertical Disintegration:

How and Why Markets Emerged in Mortgage Banking, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 465 (2005).
" See e.g., John Hagel and Marc Singer, Unbundling the Corporation, 77 HARv. Bus. REV. 133
(1999).

19 See, e.g., Martine Haas, The Double-Edged Swords of Autonomy and External Knowledge:

Analyzing Team Effectiveness in a Multinational Organization, 53 ACAD. MGMT. J. 989 (2010).
" For the European concept, see Magdalena Bernaciak, Social Dumping and the EU Integration
Process,
ETUI
WORKING
PAPER
2014.06
(2014)
available
https://www.etui.org/Publications2/Working-Papers/Social-dumping-and-the-EU-integration-process.
the American side, see, e.g., American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 106 (1968).
1

at
On

DIETER HARDER, JOB TRANSFER EUROPE, WORK IN TRANSITION 2: SMALL FAMILY BUSINESSES

145 (2001).
" Annette Bernhardt, Michael W. Spiller, & Nik Theodore, Employers Gone Rogue: Explaining
Industry Variation in Violations of Workplace Laws, 66 INDUS. LAB. REL. REV. 808 (2013).
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former must now compete either through suppressing the labor rights and standards
of their employees, or through outsourcing to thinly capitalized contractors who, by
virtue of intense competition for contracts with larger client corporations, are even
more likely than larger employers to compete by lowering labor costs. 23 Indeed,
employers' loss of autonomy under conditions of injurious competition and the
ancillary damage to community wellbeing have been recognized in landmark
24
decisions of the US Supreme Court. Such competition may weaken the most vital
workplace standards such as norms for safe operation of hazardous facilities to
the detriment not only of workers but also of wider communities. One well
documented instance resulted from outsourcing by certain petrochemical
companies. 25 To avoid designation as legally liable "controlling" employers, the
companies reduced their training and oversight of inexpert sub-contractors, resulting
in higher accident rates and cases of plant-wide catastrophes.
But the harms extend beyond the loss of autonomy, corrosion of occupational
norms, and diminished wellbeing of employees, the self-employed, and their
immediate communities. Recent decades have seen a startling growth in economic
inequality across advanced market economies, generated in the first instance in the
labor market, and only partially relieved, after the fact, by social safety nets and
active labor market policies designed to correct market outcomes. 26 Outsourcing,
self-employment, and social dumping contribute to market inequality, for reasons
outlined above. 2 7 Self-employment further weakens workers' bargaining power by
eroding the much-vaunted European "social dialogue," that is, collective bargaining
between employees and employers. The erosion of this dialogue is caused by the
downward pressure on labor standards and by the decreased percentage of
unionizable employees in sectors marked by increased self-employment.28
With greatly increased economic inequality comes macroeconomic pathologies,
including reduced mass purchasing power and the consequent failure of the economy

" See generally Catherine Ruckelshaus, Rebecca Smith, Sarah Leberstein, & Eunice Cho, Who 's the
Boss: Restoring Accountability for Labor Standards in Outsourced Work, NELP (2014), available at
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/02/Whos-the-Boss-Restoring-Accountability-Labor-StandardsOutsourced-Work-Report.pdf.
14 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 396 400 (1937) (overruling
Adkins v.
1923
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (
); recognizing that, by imposing minimum wages, the legislature
enabled all employers to pay higher wages rather than succumb to "injurious competition" by means of
"exploitation" of their employees; also noting that such unfair competition and "sweating" of workers was
a source of harm to community welfare, since the citizenry as a whole must step in to sustain basic living
standards when employers paid substandard wages).
" James Rebitzer, Job Safety and Contract Workers in the PetrochemicalIndustry, 34 INDUS. REL.
40 (1995); Thomas A. Kochan Michael Smith, John C. Wells, and James Rebitzer, Human Resource
Strategies and Contingent Workers: The Case of Safety and Health in the PetrochemicalIndustry, 33
HUM. RES. MGMT. 55 (1994).
16 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: How TODAY'S
DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS

OUR FUTURE xxv-xxvi, xxix-xxxiii, 13, 351 (2012).
17 See WEIL, supra note 1.
" See, e.g., Marc Van der Meer, Jelle Visser, and Ton Wilthagen, Adaptive and Reflexive
Governance: The Limits of Organised Decentralisation, 11 EUR. J. INDUS. REL. 347 (2005); Thomas
Prosser, Financializationand the Reform of EuropeanIndustrialRelations System, 20 EUR. J. INDUS. REL.
351 (2014).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW

[VOL 22.2

to achieve its growth potential. 29 Debt-driven policies to sustain economic demand
have, in highly visible and painful ways, contributed to financial disequilibrium and
crises. 30 Both financialization and inequality even threaten social and political
stability, as we see vividly in the southern European economies. The off-loading of
labor services to legally unprotected self-employment is only one of many factors
underlying these trends; but it is a non-trivial phenomenon that conflicts with various
dimensions of the "social policy" embodied in EU Treaties and decisions of the
Court of Justice, as discussed below.
II. THE COLLISION BETWEEN MINIMUM FEES AND EUROPEAN
COMPETITION LAW
One possible response to these labor-market dynamics is to set minimum fees
for the self-employed. To diminish the many potential negative consequences of
unfair competition among the self-employed, between the self-employed and
employees, and between the self-employed and larger employers, minimum fees for
the self-employed could be introduced in occupations or sectors vulnerable to
"injurious competition" or "social dumping."
The idea of minimum fees is more than merely hypothetical. For example, the
FNV a federation of Dutch labor unions has campaigned for minimum fees for
the self-employed on the ground that the largely immigrant group of self-employed
laborers substantially suppresses the wages and employment benefits of
employees. 31 But even highly skilled professional occupations, such as architects
that do not face competition from low-wage immigrant labor, are not immune from
such downward pressure on wages and employment. Dutch associations of
employers and employees representing the architecture industry have recently made
a bold move. The social partners (unions and employer associations) concluded a
collective bargaining agreement giving self-employed architects the right to invoke,
against their clients, the working conditions incorporated in the collective
agreement 2
More importantly, from the point of view of European jurisprudence, the Court
of Justice recently decided a case, FNVKunsten Informatie en Media, presenting the
question whether minimum fees for the self-employed, adopted in a collective
bargaining agreement, are exempt from provisions of EU competition law that would
otherwise make such fees illegal. The Court ultimately dodged the question by
remanding to the referring court to determine whether the ostensibly self-employed
in question were "false self-employed" and were therefore in fact employees rather
than self-employed. But, in light of the widespread legal and political backlash

0

1

See Stiglitz, supra note 26, at xxv-xxvi, xxix-xxxiii, 13, 351.

WOLFGANG STREECK, BUYING TIME: THE DELAYED CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM (2014).

Ed Groot & Job Woudt, FNV wil Bodem voor Tarieven Zelfstandigen. Conflict Dreigt met

Concurrentietoezichthouder NMa [FNV Wants Minimum Fees for the Self-employed. Conflict Looms
with Competition Authority NMa], HET FINANCItLE DAGBLAD, Mar. 18, 2006. See also Brishen Rogers,
The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. Dialogue 85, 99 (2015).
" Eppo K6nig, De cao kan z6 nog een eeuw mee na een Flinke Verbouwing [The CBA will go for
Another Century - After Major Reconstruction],
NRC HANDELSBLAD (May 23, 2015),
http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2015/05/23/de-cao-kan-zo-nog-een-eeuw-mee-na-een-flinke-1497707.
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against "unfair" self-employment, the Court will almost certainly face the question
again and give it a direct answer.
Part IV of this Article discusses various postures in which the issue is likely to
arise, the most compelling responses the Court should give in each such setting, and
therefore the legal strategies that advocates for minimum fees are well-advised to
pursue.
Before addressing those issues, it is important to set out the relevant framework
of European competition law, and the empirical trends in self-employment across
EU Member States. In Europe, the collective setting of minimum fees for the selfemployed arises in the first instance (if at all) from national labor law. For example,
in the Netherlands, it is possible to include such a minimum fee in a collective
bargaining agreement. The Collective Labor Act of 1927 includes the following
provision: "A collective labour agreement may also relate to contracts for the
performance of specific work and contracts for professional services. The provisions
in the present law concerning33 labour agreements, employers and employees shall
then apply mutatis mutandis."

Yet some provisions of EU law appear to raise problems for self-employed fees
set at the domestic level whether by statutory mandate or by collectively bargained
contracts. The EU outlaws agreements between undertakings that limit competition
in the EU market (Article 101 TFEU). 34 The Court of Justice has consistently
defined the concept of the undertaking as "every entity engaged in any economic
activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way it is financed., 35 In
Commission v Italy, the Court of Justice held that an economic activity is any
activity consisting in "offering goods and services" on a given market. 36 The Court
used a functional approach: the nature of the activities is decisive. 3,7 Natural persons
therefore fall within the definition of "undertaking" as long as they perform
economic activities. 38 Hence, the self-employed, whether acting as individuals or as
" FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v. The Netherlands, Case C-413/13, EU:C:2014:241 1, 3.
14 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 101, Dec. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J.
(C 326)
[hereinafter TFEU]. The Dutch Competition Act [hereinafter DCA] contains a very similar prohibition.
According to Article 6(1) DCA, collusive behavior is prohibited if its object or effect is the hindrance,
impediment or distortion of competition in all or part of the Dutch market. Article 16(a) DCA stipulates
that the prohibition of Article 6(1) is not applicable to a collective bargaining agreement within the
1 1
meaning of Article ( ) of the Law on Collective Labour Agreements. Act of 22 May 1997, Providing
New Rules for Economic Competition (Competition Act), 1997 Stb., 242 (Neth.).
" H6fner and Elser v. Macrotron, Case C-41/90, EU:C: 1991:161, 21.
16 Commission v. Italy, Case 118/85, EU:C:1987:283,
7.
17 Commission Communication on a Single Market for the 21 st Century Europe: Services
of General
Interest, Including Social Services of General Interest, at 5, COM (2007) 725 final (Nov. 20, 2007).
" For European Courts, see, e.g., FNCBV and Others v. Commission, Joined Cases T-217/03 and T245/03, EU:T:2006:391; Wouters and Others v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten,
Case C-309/99, EU:C:2002:98; Pavlov and Others v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten,
Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, EU:C:2000:428; Consiglio Nazionale Degli Spedizionieri Doganali
v. Commission, Case T-513/93, EU:T:2000:91; Commission v. Italy, Case C-35/96, EU:C:1998:303. For
decisions of the European Commission, see, e.g., Commission Decision, Bar~me d'honoraires de l'Ordre
des
Architectes
belges
(Case
COMP/A.38.549),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decdocs/38549/38549 72 1.pdf, Commission Decision
2003/600/EC, French Beef (Case COMP/C.38279/F3), 2003 O.J. (L 209) 12; Commission Decision
95/188/EC, Coapi (Case IV/33.686), 1995 O.J. (L 122) 37; Commission Decision 78/516/EEC,
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employers of a very small staff, qualify as undertakings for competition law
purposes because they offer services and goods on the market.
At first blush it appears that minimum fees fixed by bilateral or multilateral
agreements among the self-employed or by collective bargaining agreements
between unions representing the self-employed and associations of employers are in
conflict with EU law since these agreements are concluded between undertakings
and restrict price competition in the product market prices, that is, in the form of
fees paid for the services of the self-employed. Therefore, the central question
explored in this Article is whether that seemingly straightforward conclusion is in
fact true or, to the contrary, are there convincing legal arguments that minimum
fees for the self-employed may be set without infringing EU competition law? Are
there legal "U-turns" that avoid collision with competition law which preserve the
economic benefits while at the same time diminishing the social risks of Uberization?
Before examining four potential U-turns, the next Part sets out the relevant
empirical trends in self-employment across Member States of the EU.
III. EMPIRICAL TRENDS OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE
How extensive is the phenomenon of self-employment in Europe? And how
robust is the trend of increasing percentage of the self-employed in the overall labor
market? Figure 1 below a graph generated by Eurostat shows the number of selfemployed in the EU. 39 The figure shows the number of self-employed as a
percentage of total employment (x-axis) and the percentage of the self-employed
who hire employees other than themselves (y-axis).

RAI/UNITEL (Case IV/29.559), 1978 O.J. (L 157) 39; Commission Decision 76/743/EEC, Reuter/BASF
(Case IV/28.996), 1976 O.J. (L 254) 40; Commission Decision 76/29/EEC, AOIP/Beyrard (Case
IV/26.949), Commission Decision 76/29/EEC 1975 O.J. (L 6) 8.
'9 Martin Teichgraber, Labour Market and Labour Force Survey (LFS) Statistics, EUROSTAT (last
visited
Mar.
1,
2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Labour market and Labour force survey %28LFS%29 statistics.
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The self-employed comprised 16.4 percent of the total work force in the EU in
2014. 4 1 In comparison to the US, the average self-employment figure of the EU is
quite high. In the US the total self-employment percentage was 10.1 percent in 2014;
of that total, 3.7 percentage points were incorporated self-employed and 6.4
42
unincorporated.
4' Eurostat, Labour Market and Labour Force Survey (LFS) Statistics (last accessed Mar. 21, 2016),

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Labour market and Labour force survey (LFS) statistics. This image is reprinted
in accordance with Europa's Copyright Notice and Free Re-Use of Data policy, availableat
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/about/our-partners/copyright.
1 See Tezchgraber, supra note
39.
4' Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics, (last accessed Mar. 1, 2016),
http://www.bls.gov/cps/lfcharacteristics.htm#self (Dataset Self-employed series, Table A9 Selected
employment indicator, age category 16 years and older, May 8, 2015). Percentages calculated by (i)
dividing the number of unincorporated self-employed by the number of employed persons and (ii)
dividing the number of incorporated self-employed by the number of employed persons. The selfemployment data of the Bureau of Labor Statistics is based on the question "Last week were you
employed by government, by a private company, a nonprofit organization, or were you self-employed?"
in the current population survey. By using this criterion, the dataset excludes the temporary/irregular
and to some extent the part-time self-employed. The data is therefore only roughly comparable with the
data of Eurostat. The methodology used by Eurostat is to count people as having two jobs when they are
partially employed but also have their own business. EU Labour Force Survey Explanatory Notes,
EUROSTAT (last accessed Mar. 2, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1978984/6037342/EULFS-explanatory-notes-from-2014-onwards.pdf. On self-employment in the US, see Justin Fox, Where
Are All the Self-Employed Workers?, HARV. BUS. REV.(Feb. 7, 2014), https:Hhbr.org/2014/02/where-areall-the-self-employed-workers.
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In Europe, the Member States with the largest share of self-employed are:
Greece (31.3 percent), Italy (23.3 percent), Romania (20.5 percent), Portugal (19.2
percent) and Poland (18.3 percent).43 The large proportion of agricultural and
informal work in these Member States explains in part the high self-employment
percentages. 44 The Member States with the lowest self-employment percentage are
Luxembourg (8.3 percent), Denmark (8.7 percent), Estonia (8.9 percent), Sweden
(10.1 percent) and Germany (10.5 percent). A reason for these comparatively low
(but still absolutely significant) percentages may be because in these Member States
the general wage levels are relatively high, the social security systems are
comparatively strong, and labor market policy is more active. Consequently, the rate
of informal self-employment is limited.45 This does not hold for Estonia, however,
46
where wages are relatively low and labor market flexibility is high. The country's
low self-employment percentage may be explained by its tax regime. In Estonia, the
self-employed are obliged to pay, in addition to income tax, thirty-three percent
social tax on their net business income. 47 This tax regime may impede the inception
of self-employed businesses or may drive self-employment underground,
suppressing the official rate of self-employment.
These data indicate that those Member States with the highest self-employment
percentages are geographically spread throughout the EU. The Member States in the
lowest range are geographically more concentrated. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the
lowest and highest ranges do not correlate with older and newer Member States of
the Union. However, a distinction can be made between southern and eastern
Member States with relatively high (if not the highest) rates of self-employment and
northern and western
Member States with relatively low (if not the lowest) rates of
48
self-employment.
A plausible hypothesis is that Member States with relatively high selfemployment rates may account for much of the free circulation of workers within the
EU. 4 9 The self-employed are not hindered by agreements stipulating where the labor
itself has to be performed. Self-employment typically provides more flexibility with
41 With respect to the data presented hereafter, the calculated percentages in this paper may differ
slightly from the graphic above. The difference is the result of rounding and/or the updating nature of the
dataset. EUROSTAT, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset lfsa egaps&lang en (last
accessed Mar. 22, 2016). (Dataset Employment by Sex, Age and Professional Status (1000), [lfsa egaps],
age category 15 years and older). Percentages calculated by dividing the number of self-employed by the
number of employed persons, per Member State. Data used in this Article was extracted on May 16, 2015.
44

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT OBSERVATORY REVIEW: SELF-EMPLOYMENT

IN EUROPE 7 (2010); Mihails Hazans, Informal Workers Across Europe: Evidence from 30 European
Countries
[Institute
for
the
Study
of
Labor
(IZA)
Working
Paper,
2011],
http://www.iza.org/conference files/InfoETE2011/hazans ml142.pdf.
45
Izzy Hatfield, Self-Employment in Europe, J.P. MORGAN
CHASE & CO.
8,
http://www.ippr.org/assets/media/publications/pdf/self-employment-Europe Jan2015.pdf.
46 Raul Eamets & Jaan Masso, The Paradox of the Baltic States: Labour Market Flexibility but
ProtectedWorkers?, 11 EUR. J. INDUS. REL. 71 (2005).
47 Estonia Tax & Custom Board, http://vanaweb.emta.ee/?id 1758#kolmkaks (last visited Mar. 14,
2016) (under heading 3.2 Social tax).
4' Hatfield, supra note 45, at 3.
4' This reference is to the actual movement of workers, not to the legal concept of the free movement
of workers within the strict meaning of Article 45 TFEU requiring the performance of work under control
of another.
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regard to the place where the business is conducted or the location where the labor
can be performed. Indeed, because the self-employed incur the financial risk of
providing their labor services, they have greater incentive than actors who do not
bear such risk to move their enterprise to a new location if that results in a
competitive advantage.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to test these hypotheses because the database of
Eurostat is not equipped for such analysis. The movement of workers could be
quantified by using general data on immigration and emigration. 0 But it is only
possible since 2013 to correct for returning migrants. It is also impossible to
establish the member state of origin of outbound and inbound migrants.
The Member States with the highest number of self-employed that hire
additional employees are: Hungary (48.1 percent), Germany (44.1 percent), Austria
(41.7 percent) and Denmark (40.3 percent).51 Strikingly, the overall share of selfemployed in this upper range is very low (Denmark) to low (Germany, Hungary, and
Austria). In other words, in these four countries the share of self-employment is low,
while a relatively high number of the self-employed, at least forty percent, employs
staff. The Member States with the lowest number of self-employed that hire
additional employees are: Romania (5.6 percent), 52 UK (17.1 percent), Czech
Republic (19.9 percent) and Greece (20.2 percent)5 3 In this lower range the picture
is more dispersed with respect to the overall self-employment rate. Romania and
Greece both have a relatively high number of self-employed (20.5 percent and 31.3
percent respectively) but relatively little self-employment with staff (5.6 percent and
20.2 percent respectively)5 4
The distribution of occupations and the level of skilled work influence the
number of self-employed with employees. In Germany, the majority of the selfemployed are highly skilled and active in the services sector.55 As a result, the
prevalence of self-employed with employees is relatively high in Germany. In
Romania, on the other hand, almost eighty percent of the self-employed are small
farmers . 56 The probability that these farmers hire employees is small, since these
farmers usually rely on their family members, translating into a low percentage of
self-employed with employees.

50

For

migration,

see,

EUROSTAT,

http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset migr immlctz&lang en, (Dataset Immigration
by Five-year age group, Sex and Citizenship (1000), [migr immlctz] (last accessed Mar. 22, 2016). See,
for
emigration,
EUROSTAT,
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?wai true&dataset migr emilctz, (Dataset Emigration by
Five-year age group, Sex and Citizenship (1000), [migr emil ctz] (last accessed Mar. 14, 2016).
51See Eurostat, supra note 43 (Dataset Employment by Sex, Age and Professional Status (1000),
[lfsa egaps], Age Category 15 Years and Older, May 6, 2015). Percentages calculated by dividing the
number of self-employed with employees by the number of self-employed persons, per Member State.
Data extracted on May 18, 2015.
51 Please note that Romania is not presented in Figure 1.
53Id.
54 Id.

55 European Commission, supra note 44, at 7.
56Id. at 6.
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" 2012: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK.
2005: under I, excluding Croatia.
1994: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK.
60 2015: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain.
61 2014: under IV, excluding Lithuania.
6 2011: under IV, excluding Lithuania, and Latvia.
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Overall, the number of self-employed with employees has decreased in the last
63
decade and the number of own-account self-employed has increased. However, the
statistics discussed do not provide insight into the longitudinal trend in selfemployment as a percentage of all employment. Nonetheless, by using the
alternative dataset of "Employment by sex, age and professional status" it is possible
to construct a table extending from 1984 to 2014, in five-year intervals, to show the
trend of self-employment
expressed as a percentage of the total number of employed
64
persons over time.
The Netherlands and Slovenia exhibit the most significant increase in the
percentage of self-employed. In the Netherlands, the self-employed comprised 10.0
percent of total employment in 1989 and 16.2 percent in 2014. 65 In Slovenia, the
figure increased from 7.4 percent in 1999 to 15.3 percent in 2014. The share of selfemployed in the UK also rose: from 11.3 percent in 1984 to 14.8 percent in 2014.
The Institute for Public Policy Research suggests that forty percent of the growth in
employment between 2010 and 2014 has been in self-employment. 66 Germany also
shows an increase, though less significant, from 9.3 percent in 1984 to 10.5 percent
in 2014. During the
economic crisis the number of self-employed remained fairly
67
stable in Germany.
Strikingly, the percentage of self-employed declined in Belgium and France
from 1984 to 2009, although both countries show an increase in the percentage of
self-employed from 2009 to 2014. In reaction to the economic crisis, Belgium,
Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Slovakia and the UK have implemented
68
measures to support self-employment and "small and medium enterprises" (SMEs).
The measures may have dampened the increase in unemployment rates by enabling
the otherwise unemployed to stay active in the labor marked by starting a business or
sustaining an existing business. At the same time, the recent increase in the selfemployed in the western Member States may be an indication of economic recovery
in national labor markets, explained by rejuvenation in small business activity.
The number of self-employed quite drastically declined in: Ireland from 21.7
percent in 1984 to 16.6 percent in 2014; 69 Portugal from 26.4 percent in 1989 to 19.2
percent in 2014; Lithuania from 16.4 percent in 1999 to 10.8 percent in 2014;
Hungary from 14.9 percent in 1999 to 10.6 percent in 2014, and; Croatia from 20.9
percent in 2004 to 14.1 percent in 2014. Spain also shows a decline from 21.6
percent in 1989 to 15.9 percent in 2009. The Spanish share of self-employment
increased however from 2009 onwards and was 17.0 percent in 2014. The same

6'

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, SOCIAL PROTECTION RIGHTS OF ECONOMICALLY DEPENDENT SELF-

EMPLOYED
WORKERS
22
(2013).
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/507449/IPOLEMPL ET(2013)507449 EN.pdf.
64 See Eurostat, supra note 43 (Dataset Employment by Sex, Age and Professional Status; Data
retrieved May 26, 2015).
6' For all percentages of self-employed by country in this paragraph, see search query supra note 64.
66 Hatfield, supra note 45, at 10.
67 European Commission, supra note 44, at 8.
68id.
69 For

all percentages of self-employed by country in this paragraph, see search query supra note 64.
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trend is shown in Greece with a decline from 35.9 percent in 1984 to 29.4 percent in
2009 and a subsequent rise to 31.3 percent in 2014. In some countries, for example
in Spain, the decline in self-employment may partially be explained by the decline of
self-employment among older workers (fifty to sixty-four years)70 because the
raising of 71
the retirement age causes workers to lengthen their incumbency as
employees.
There are also Member States where the percentage of self-employment is quite
steady, such as Austria (10.9 percent in 1999 to 11.3 percent in 2014), Finland (13.0
percent in 1999 to 13.5 percent in 2014), Sweden (10.9 percent in 1999 to 10.1
percent in 2014), and Malta (14.1 percent in 2004 to 13.8 percent in 2014). 72
The occupations of the self-employed vary widely in the EU. In northern
Europe, over sixty percent of the German self-employed and fifty-nine percent of the
Dutch self-employed work in highly skilled occupations (such as technicians,
professionals, and managers).7 3 In the UK the rate is only forty-six percent, quite low
relative to the rates of those two northern European countries. The self-employed in
the southern and eastern Member States are more likely to be engaged in low- and
mid-skilled occupations. In Spain, thirty-seven percent of the self-employed work in
low skilled jobs (for example service and sales work, plant and machine operators
and assemblers) while in Poland sixty-nine percent of the self-employed work in
mid-skilled jobs (such as clerical support, agriculture, forestry and fishery, and craft
and trade related work). More than one-fifth of the self-employed in the UK work in
the construction industry7 4 Spain has a particularly high concentration of service and
sales workers who are self-employed. According to the Institute for Public Policy
Research, the average self-employed worker in the UK earned about forty percent
less compared to his or her employed peer in 2011.7 5 Throughout Europe, the
earnings of the average self-employed decreased at a faster rate than the earnings of
the average employee in recent years.
In conclusion, the percentage of self-employed workers in the European labor
market is substantial. The overall trend of self-employment as a percentage of total
employment across Member States, however, is highly variable. On the one hand,
there are Member States that show a steady decrease in self-employment. Possible
factors that may contribute to this development could be : (i) stringent labor market
regulation and active labor market policies, (ii) stronger social security and pension
policies, (iii) contraction of the labor market due to the recent and, in many cases,
ongoing recession, and (iv) implosion of certain occupations due to technological
change and globalization.76 On the other hand, Member States with traditionally low
percentages of self-employment show an enormous increase in the last few years.
7' Hatfield, supra note 45, at 14.
71

EUROFOUND, EMPLOYMENT TRENDS AND POLICIES FOR OLDER WORKERS IN THE RECESSION 6-8

(2012).
71See supra note 64.
71See supra note 45, at 24.
71Id. at 25 26.
75Id. at 4.
76 See supra note 56, at 14; HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY

SURVEY AND INTRODUCTION 614 16 (Acs & Audretsch eds., 2010).
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Factors that influence this growth could be related to (i) legally mandated burdens
of the wage term of the employment contract (too expensive, too stringent), (ii) other
financial burdens of labor laws, regulations and collective bargaining agreements
(dismissal protection, implementation of health and safety rules, social security and
pension contributions), and (iii) tax incentives for self-employment.7 7
IV.

FOUR LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR IMPOSING MINIMUM FEES FOR THE
SELF-EMPLOYED

As shown in the data above, the percentage of self-employment is high
exceeding fifteen percent of the labor force, or approximately one in seven working
people in many EU Member States, and has increased quite significantly over time
in some states, most notably in the UK and the Netherlands. Self-employment is
ostensibly consistent with the economic principles of the EU on the rationale that
self-employment promotes efficiency and competitiveness. But the EU also has a
social face; and as described in Part I of this Article, self-employment poses
potential threats to core European principles of autonomy, social welfare, equality,
quality of employment, and social dialogue7 8 One proposed response is, by direct
analogy with minimum wages, to set minimum fees for the self-employed, but such
fee-setting seems to run directly against the proscriptions of European competition
law.
The first of four proposed U-turns to avoid collision between minimum fees and
competition law is the construction of a private fee-setting association that would act
as an intermediary between the self-employed and their clients. The second U-turn
entails the collaboration of the self-employed with unions by adopting minimum fees
for the self-employed in collective bargaining agreements between unions and the
enterprises that both hire the unionized employees and contract with the selfemployed in question. The third U-turn is a simple government mandate imposing
fee scales through legislation or regulation. The fourth U-turn urges the Court of
Justice of the EU in order to ease the disjuncture that self-employment raises
between economic and social policy to draw on the concept of "labor group"
embraced for decades by the US Supreme Court.
A. U-turn 1: Invoking an "Association" as a Shield
That EU competition law prohibits collusive behavior between undertakings is a
commonplace 7 9 Prior to parsing Article 101 (1) TFEU, one might think that an easy
77See supra note 56, at 18 20.
7' Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Social Protection Rights of Economically Dependent

Self Employed
Workers,
European
Parliament,
at
91
(April
2013),
available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/507449/IPOLEMPL ET(2013)507449 EN.pdf. In European parlance, "social dialogue" refers to deliberations among
representatives of business, labor, and in some instances government. Social dialogue may occur at the
levels of the enterprise, the industry, the nation, or Europe-wide.
79TFEU art.101 (1) ("The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices
which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in particular those which: (a)
directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; (b) limit or control
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way to get around that prohibition is to create an association that would claim to act
as an intermediary between the self-employed and their clients and would impose
minimum fees on all parties. Under this strategy, the association would shield
otherwise anticompetitive behavior among undertakings against challenge by the
competition authorities. In theory, the association as an entity, rather than the several
self-employed by horizontal agreement, is the actor imposing the minimum fee. The
question, then, is whether such an association could be validly used as a means to
collectively set fees that apply to the self-employed.
Upon examining the text of Article 101(1) TFEU, we see, unsurprisingly, that
European legislators anticipated this strategy and concluded that, from a competition
law perspective, it is undesirable. If an association performs economic activities and
in that context effectively concludes anticompetitive agreements with each of several
undertakings, then the agreements are caught by Article 101(1) TFEU
notwithstanding that the association acts in its own right. The European legislators
took care to declare that the existence of a horizontal agreement among undertakings
is not necessary for the applicability of the competition rules. That is, a hub-andspoke configuration of contracts between the association and several undertakings
violates the Treaty to the same degree as a straightforward horizontal agreement
among them. In addition, Article 101(1) TFEU applies to decisions by an association
independent of whether the association itself performs any economic activities.
Therefore, the association either acts merely as an executive organ of a constitutive
agreement among its members or acts in its own right. In either case, EU
competition law pierces the association that U-turn 1 claims as a shield for the
setting of minimum fees.
An example of an association setting fees for the self-employed is the Belgian
Architects' Association, addressed in the European Commission Decision of June
24, 2004. The National Council, the body that represents the Belgian Architects'
Association, adopted a fee scale for architects. 80 The Minister for Small and
Medium-sized Enterprises refused the National Council's request to declare the scale
of fees generally binding. 81 The Belgian Architects' Association published the fee
scale on its website and distributed it among its members. 82 The fee scale was also
the only source referred to in a standard architect-client contract provided by the
Association. 83 In reaction to the objection of the Belgian Competition Council, the
National Council, in June 2002, circulated among its members a statement that the
fee scale should be understood only as a guideline. 84 The European Commission
started an investigation into the scale of fees in October 2002. 85 According to the
production, markets, technical development, or investment; (c) share markets or sources of supply; (d)
apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no
connection with the subject of such contracts.").
oCommission Decision, Bar~me d'honoraires, supra note 38, at 8, 18 21.

Id. 18.
Id.

21.

Id.

83.

Id.

20.

15Commission

Decision, Bar~me d'honoraires, supra note 38, at

31.
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legal assessment conducted by the Commission, architects are deemed undertakings
because they provide their services for remuneration on the market. 86 Furthermore,
the Architects' Association was an association of distinct undertakings; and a
regulation such as minimum fees was the expression of the will of those distinct
members 7that the latter should act in a certain way when conducting economic
activities. 8
In short, according to the Commission, an association's decision to adopt a fee
88
scale is deemed equivalent to a horizontal decision among multiple undertakings, 89
and the fee scale is an act intended to govern the behavior of those undertakings.
On this logic, the Commission concluded that the minimum fee scale had as its
object the restriction of competition within the common market. 90 The Commission
imposed on the Belgian
Architects' Association a fine of C 100,000 for its violation
91
of competition law.
The Commission was not receptive to the defenses put forward by the Belgian
Architects' Association. First, it claimed its conduct fell outside the scope of Article
101(1) TFEU, on the ground that it exercised public power. The Commission
responded that the mere fact that the Architects' Association was responsible for
drawing up and enforcing a code of ethics did not remove the Association from the
scope of Article 101(1) TFEU. 92 While drafting the code of ethics, the Association
had no special duty to protect the general interest. 93 Furthermore, the fact that the fee
scale was designated as a mere guideline was insufficient to disqualify the fee scale
as a decision of an association of undertakings. 94 The decisive factor was whether
the Association intended to coordinate the self-employed's conduct in the market in
a certain way. Factors that confirm this intent to coordinate were, among others, the
prescriptive tone of the preamble to the code of ethics, the fact that an architect may
have faced disciplinary penalties if he or she deviated from the fee scale, and 95
the fact
that the standard architect-client contract referred exclusively to the fee scale.
Significantly, however, the Commission acknowledged that recommended
prices are not always contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU. 9 6 The Commission argued
that in this instance the introduction of a fee scale was not necessary to ensure the
proper practice of the architects' profession: the fee scale did not prevent architects
from offering poor-quality services. To the contrary, the scale may have discouraged
architects from working
cost-efficiently, from improving the quality of their work, or
97
from innovating.

6

Id.

36, 37.

id

38, 44.
Id. 74.
Id.
49, 64, 66.
9' Commission Decision, Barame d'honoraires, supra note 38, at
91 Id. at
138.
9' Id. at 40.
9' Id. at 43.
9' Id.
62-64.
95 Commission Decision, Barame d'honoraires, supra note 38, at
96 Id.
77, 99.
97 Id.

90.

69 73.
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The Court faced a somewhat more complex question about associational
regulation in the case of Ordem dos Thchnicos Oficiais de Contas (hereinafter,
"OTOC").98 The OTOC is the Portuguese Order of Chartered Accountants. At issue
was the OTOC's implementation of a system of compulsory training for chartered
accountants. The OTOC's Quality Control Regulation (hereafter, "QC Regulation")
gave the OTOC an exclusive right to provide institutional training to chartered
accountants. 99 The QC Regulation charged the OTOC with the authorization of
bodies providing professional training 00
for chartered accountants under the
substantive standards of the QC Regulation.
The OTOC argued before the Appeals Court in Lisbon that it had a public
service mission and its training activities therefore fell outside the scope of Article
101(1) TFEU. 1° 1 Referring to Wouters,102 the OTOC maintained that the restrictive
effects that resulted from its QC Regulation were justified by "the need to ensure
proper exercise of the profession of chartered accountant." ' 103 One of the issues
before the Court of Justice was whether the OTOC satisfied the definition of an
association of undertakings. The Court first found that chartered accountants are
undertakings since they offer, for remuneration, accounting services on the
market. 104 The Court continued by pointing out that the QC Regulation directly
influenced the economic activities in the market of compulsory training because
providers that wished to offer professional training were subject to the QC
Regulation and needed to be authorized by the OTOC.1 0 5 Furthermore, the obligation
for chartered accountants to enjoy training was closely related to the practice of their
profession.
The fact that the QC Regulation did not directly affect the economic activity of
chartered accountants did not remove the decision of the OTOC from the scope of
Article 101(1) TFEU. The Court found, rather, that a decision of an association of
undertakings may also be contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU if the decision concerns
the market in which that association itself performs an economic activity. 1° 6 The fact
that the State required the association to put in place a system of compulsory training
was immaterial.1 0 7 Because the QC Regulation itself was adopted without any input
from the State, the decision of the association was not excluded from the scope of
Article 101 (1) TFEU based on the "public power" exception. 108
These cases show that the European Commission and the Court of Justice are
reluctant to accept the argument put forward by the associations that their behavior
does not fall within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU when the association in some
" Ordem dos Tcnicos Oficiais de Contas v. Autoridade da Concorr~ncia,
EU:C:2013:127 [hereinafter OTOC].
99
Id. 11.
100 Id. 13.
101Id.
28.
10' Wouters, EU:C:2002:98.
10' OTOC, EU:C:2013:127.
104Id. TT 37, 38.
105Id.
42.
06
1 Id.
45.
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fashion regulates the economic activities conducted by its members. Indeed, in the
OTOC case the Court of Justice goes a step further by ruling that a decision of an
association can also infringe Article 101(1) TFEU if the decision merely influences
conduct in the market in which the association performs economic activities.
It is true, under these rulings, that an association may escape the prohibition of
Article 101(1) TFEU when (i) the association exercises powers connected to the
powers of a public authority11°109 or (ii) the association fulfils a social function based
on the principle of solidarity.'
An entity exercises public powers if (i) the entity has the duty to perform a task
that falls within the public interest of the sort served by essential functions of the
State111 and (ii) the activity is connected "by [its] nature, [its] aim and the rules to
which [it is] subject, [... ] with the exercise of powers [... ] which are typically those
of a public authority."1' 12 But it is hard to imagine an association representing a
profession, setting fees for the self-employed, to fall within the public power
exception. In Barme d'honoraires de l'Ordre des Architectes belges, the
Commission found unconvincing the argument of the association that it was
exercising public power because it had the duty to draw up a code of ethics. The
same argument, put forward113by the Dutch Bar Association, was not accepted by the
Court of Justice in Wouters.
A successful appeal to the second exception just mentioned the solidarity
exception is even less likely. Under the cases defining that exception, the social
aim of an entity is not in itself sufficient to exclude activities from the scope of
Article 101(1) TFEU. The entity needs to show "actual" solidarity. The indicia of
actual solidarity are relatively narrow: (i) the contribution paid by the self-employed
is "not systematically proportionate to the risk insured"'1 14 and (ii) the amount of
benefits paid by the association is disproportionate to the insured persons'
earnings. 115 In addition the association must be subjected to state supervision. 116 The
rationale of these criteria is clear enough: in order to escape competition-law
proscriptions, the association must act in the nature of a public social-insurance fund
that provides subsidies exceeding the contributions of the association members and
that is subject to some form of government oversight.
While the cases and rules discussed above seem to shut the door on minimum
fees imposed by an association of the self-employed, other decisions suggest that the
Court of Justice may uphold such fee-imposition if it promotes the integrity of the
109
110

SAT Fluggesellschaft v. Eurocontrol, Case C-364/92, EU:C: 1994:7, 30 32.
Poucet v. AGF & Camulrac and Pistre v. Cancava, Joined Cases C-159/91 & C-160/91,

EU:C:1993:63, 18, 19.
. Diego Cali & Figli v. Servizi ecologici porto di Genova, Case C-343/95, EU:C:1997:160, 22.
.. SAT, EU:C:1994:7, 30.
.. Wouters, EU:C:2002:98.
14 See, e.g., Poucet, EU:C:1993:63,
18; Cisal di Battistello Venanzio v. INAIL, Case C-218/00,
EU:C:2002:36,
39; Kattner Stahlbau v. Maschinenbau- und Metall- Berufsgenossenschaft, Case C350/07, EU:C:2009:127,
AG2R Pr6voyance v. Beaudout Pere et Fils, Case C-437/09,
EU:C:2011:112, 47.
115 Cisal, EU:C:2002:36,
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occupation in question. The essential element is that the restricting effects of an
association's decision directly promote the proper practice of the profession. In
Cipolla, a case concerning the freedom of establishment, the Court of Justice found
that the characteristics of the legal services market played a role in deciding whether
a restriction of the freedom of establishment by means of fixed minimum fees could
be justified.1 17 One feature of the market was that the number of practicing lawyers
was very large. These lawyers were forced to compete with each other and offered
discounts at the risk of offering poor quality. Another feature that the Court found
important was the asymmetry of information between customers and lawyers.
Customers typically lack the in-depth knowledge necessary to judge the quality of
legal services. By close analogy, the Court may be willing, in competition law, to
permit an association of the self-employed to
impose minimum fees that directly
11 8
promote the proper practice of the occupation.
Indeed, even more affirmatively than in the Cipolla case, the Court of Justice
ruled in Wouters that an association's regulation proscribing partnerships among
lawyers and accountants did not infringe Article 101(1) TFEU because, despite its
restrictive effects, the regulation promoted the proper practice of the legal
profession.11 9 In that case, the Bar Association of the Netherlands prohibited its
members from practicing in full partnership with accountants. 12 Two members of
the Bar claimed in proceedings before a Dutch court that the prohibition to enter into
partnerships with members of certain professions was incompatible with inter alia
the rules on competition. The Council of State decided on appeal to stay proceedings
in order to refer preliminary questions to the Court of Justice about the interpretation
of the concept of "association of undertakings., 121 The Court of Justice found that
registered members of the Bar are undertakings because they are entities offering, for
a fee, services in the form of legal assistance. 122 The fact that the profession is
regulated does not exempt the professional entity from designation as an
undertaking. 123 The Court ruled that the Bar Association of the Netherlands was an
association of undertakings because by adopting rules such as those at issue, it
124
regulated the economic behavior of its members.
Contrary to Bartme d'honoraires de l'Ordre des Architectes belges, however,
the Court decided that the regulation did not infringe Article 101(1) TFEU. 125 The
members of the Dutch Bar Association were required to maintain their independence
vis-a-vis public authorities, other professionals and third parties. Accountants were
not subject to that requirement. Even more important, accountants were not bound
17 Cipolla v. Portolese and Macrino & Capodarte v. Meloni, Joined Cases C-94/04
and C-202/04,
EU:C:2006:758, 7 56-60.
.. On competition regulation and the service industry in Ireland, see Carol Boate & Kathryn

MacGuil, Regulating Competition in Professional Services A Balancing Act?, 9 EUR. COMPETITION J.
105 (2013).
19
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121Id.7 39.
122Id. 48.
123Id. 49.
124Wouters, EU:C:2002:98, TT 58 64.
125Id. TT 102 10.
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by the rule of professional confidentiality. Finally, the advisory activities carried out
by the members of the Bar may have been incompatible with the supervisory
activities carried out by accountants. The Court concluded that the Bar regulation,
notwithstanding its restrictive effects, served the proper practice of the legal
profession and therefore complied with Article 101 (1).
The Bar Association regulation at issue in Wouters did not involve minimum
fees. But if the reasoning in Wouters were generalized, the Court might be willing to
except minimum fees if they directly uphold occupational integrity or norms of
proper practice of the profession. This is perhaps especially true if they serve the
public interest by preventing harm to third parties, such as customers, or by
buttressing social institutions of manifest value, such as the legal system itself. Such
proof would plainly be strengthened with evidence that the intention of the
association is not simply to serve the narrow economic self-interests of its members.
An association seeking to exploit this U-turn would therefore be well-advised to
establish an independent body of experts that is, in some fashion, institutionally
insulated from representatives of the specific branch or sector. 126
In conclusion, U-turn 1 will not, in the run of cases, provide a general shield
against European competition rules. Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits agreements
between an association performing economic activities and its member undertakings,
and prohibits associational decisions that interfere with the economic activities
conducted by the self-employed or their clients. Even decisions of the association
interfering with collateral economic activities in a market in which the association
itself is merely active fall within the proscription of Article 101 (1) TFEU.
Nonetheless, U-turn 1 may be a successful strategy in many specific contexts,
based on the rationales in the Cipolla and Wouters cases. If, for example, the
association in Bartme d'honoraires de l'Ordre des Architectes belges had
successfully proved that fierce competition in the sector increased the risk of serious
errors by architects, such as the danger of collapsing buildings or bridges, the
outcome may have been different. Two other sectors are also candidates for U-turn
1 the construction sector and health-care sector. Among construction workers, the
self-employed may often be required to work far more hours to achieve the standard
of living that others achieve by working normal hours. Stress and sleep deprivation
may result in errors that jeopardize the most vital interests of the public, akin to the
interests served by maintaining proper practices among architects. 12 Minimum fees
that reduce cut-throat competition on pay would enable both the self-employed and
employees to work normal hours, experience lower stress, obtain normal sleep, and
thereby increase the quality of service. Likewise, if it could be proven that the
workload of self-employed nurses and physicians, and therefore the risk of grievous
116

See Budesanstalt flr den Gtiterfernverkehr v. Reiff, C-185/91, EU:C:1993:886,

17 ("The Tariff
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117 John W. Jones et al., Stress and Medical Malpractice: OrganizationalRisk Assessment and
Intervention, 73 J. APPL. PSYCH. 727, 733, 734 (1988); Tait D. Shanafelt et al., Burnout and Medical
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MINIMUM FEES FOR THE SELF-EMPLOYED

2016]

medical errors, could be reduced by introducing minimum fees, then perhaps the
Court, under the rationale in Wouters, would uphold fee mandates in the health-care
sector.
Some recent high-profile events, unlike the examples just cited, show that this
approach is not hypothetical real-world instances in which advocates of worker
rights have argued, in both judicial and legislative arenas, that downward
suppression of self-employed fees has indeed substantially impaired occupational
practices. One paradigmatic instance is invoked in the title of this Article: taxi
drivers and their advocates in many countries have vehemently argued that, by
depressing the fees of independent, self-employed drivers, the Uber corporation has
threatened the safety and diminished the insurance protection for both drivers and
128
passengers.
Another highly salient case, albeit limited to the US, is the conversion
of Los Angeles port truck drivers from employees of trucking fleets to self-employed
owner-drivers.12 9 Labor advocates, as well as California legislators, have concluded
that this conversion, by lowering drivers' earnings, resulted in trucks being poorly
maintained, causing measurable environmental damage and increases in highway
accidents and, ultimately, harming the safety and health of the truck drivers, other
motorists, and surrounding communities. Cases such as these may well thread the
evidentiary needle articulated by the Court of Justice in Wouters and the European
Commission in Architectes belges.
Proving that minimum fees directly promote the proper practice of a profession
or occupation will be an uphill struggle. But these conjectured and actual cases show
that such proof may be possible, or at least plausible, across a surprisingly wide
range of occupations.
B. U-turn 2. Collective BargainingAgreements That Set Minimum Fees
Another strategy for shielding minimum wage regulations against competition
law may be under the exception to certain anti-competition rules for collective
bargaining agreements between unions and unionized employers. The competition
provisions of the Treaty include no general exemption for collective bargaining
agreements; yet not all collective agreements that restrict competition are
automatically prohibited. According to Article 101(1) TFEU, to run afoul of
competition law, the agreement must affect trade between Member States.130 If the
market share of the signatory companies falls below a certain threshold the
agreement is not prohibited by Article 101(1) TFEU.
More capaciously, Article 101(3) TFEU stipulates a case-by-case exemption on
the ground that the restriction of competition is outweighed by its welfare enhancing
effects. The prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU is not applicable if the conditions set
See Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REv. DIALOGUE 85, 91 94 (2015);

1..

Ron Lieber, The Question of Coverage for Ride Service Drivers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/your-money/auto-insurance/offloading-the-risk-in-renting-a-carride.html; Dara Kerr, How Risky Is Your Uber Ride? Maybe More Than You Think, CNET, Oct. 8, 2014,
http://www.cnet.com/news/how-risky-is-your-uber-ride-maybe-more-than-you-think/.
1v9Miranda v. Pacer Cartage, No. 37-2014-00008552 (Cal. Super. Jan. 28, 2015).
0
1" See TFEU art. 101(1).
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out in Article 101(3) TFEU are met. To trigger this exemption, Article 101(3) TFEU
requires a competition-restricting agreement to contribute to any of the following: (i)
improving the production of goods and services, (ii) improving the distribution of
goods and services, (iii) promoting technical progress, or (iv) promoting economic
progress. 131 The agreement must also provide consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefits. A separate exception the so-called "block exemption" regulation
provides a collective exemption for categories of agreements in certain sectors or
industries that satisfy Article 101(3) TFEU. 132 An agreement is automatically
exempted from Article 101(1) TFEU if the conditions set out in the block exemption
are fulfilled. If an undertaking is unable to invoke one of the previously mentioned
exceptions while in breach of Article 101(1) TFEU then that agreement is
unenforceable on the ground of Article 101(2) TFEU, 133 and the undertaking could
face stiff fines.
Putting aside the block exemption, whether Article 101(3) TFEU's general
exemption provides hope for U-turn 2 seems to turn on an open-ended interpretive
question: Do "technical progress" and "economic progress" denote a relatively
narrow conception of economic efficiency, or do they instead encompass broader
notions of socioeconomic wellbeing and advancement? 134 The narrower
interpretation is the stance taken by the Commission in its Guidelines. 135 Under the
Guidelines, social partners must show that the collective agreement will generate
economic benefits of the sort comprehended by neoclassical economic theory. On
that understanding, Geradin and other commentators rightly caution corporations to
rely on a self-assessment that presumes the Court and Commission will give little
weight to "progress" along dimensions other than static or dynamic efficiencies.136
Although the Commission Guidelines and the rulings of the Court of Justice
give a constricted interpretation of the exemptions of collective bargaining
agreements from competition law based on Article 101(3) TFEU, another line of
...TFEU Art. 10 1(3) ("3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in
the case of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings,
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings,
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,

which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share
of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable
to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect
of a substantial part of the products in question.")
1
Commission Regulation 330/2010/EU, On the Application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, 2010
O.J. (L 102) 1.
1. TFEU art. 101(2) ("Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.").
1'
See Aleksander Maziarz, Do Non-Economic Goals Count in InterpretingArticle 101(3) TFEU?,
10 EUR. COMPETITION J. 341 (2014).
1.. Commission Notice on Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C
101/97),
32, 33.
1"6
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Court of Justice cases has opened wider possibilities. In its decisions in Albany,
Brentjens and Drijvende Bokken, the Court announced that collective bargaining
agreements are excluded from the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU if certain
broad conditions are fulfilled. All three cases involved arrangements with an
insurance company or pension fund for full or supplementary pensions for their
employees. 137 While the three companies had made pension arrangements for their
own enterprises' employees, the Dutch Minister for Social Affairs made affiliation to
a sectoral pension fund compulsory at the request of social partners. 138 Albany and
Brentjens asked for exemption from affiliation with the respective sectoral pension
funds since they had already concluded supplementary arrangements with another
fund. 139 The sectoral funds refused to grant Albany and Brentjens the exemption and
served the companies with a demand for payment. 14° Drijvende Bokken maintained
that it was not covered by the Ministerial order. 141 All three companies, in their
respective complaints before Dutch courts, argued that compulsory affiliation with
the sectoral funds was contrary to EU competition law. 142 The Cantonal Court
Arnhem in Albany, 143 the Cantonal Court Roermond in Brentens144 and the Dutch
Supreme Court in Drijvende Bokken 145 stayed the proceedings pending referral to the
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the compatibility of the system of
compulsory affiliation and competition law.
The Court of Justice first set out the core legal framework. On the one hand, the
EU safeguards aimed to prevent distortion of competition within the internal
147
6
market. 14 On the other hand, the EU endeavors to promote a social policy.
Various provisions in the Treaties shape that social policy. According to Article 3(3)
of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) a particular task of the EU is to promote
inter alia a high level of employment and social protection. 148 In that regard close
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cooperation between employer and employees, especially with respect to the right of
association and collective bargaining, is considered important. 149 The Commission is
responsible for developing a dialogue between employees' and employers'
organizations. 150 That dialogue may lead to contractual relations, which may be
implemented by the Member States or by a Council decision on a proposal from the

Commission. 151
In light of this EU social policy, the Court acknowledged that a certain
restriction of competition is inherent in collective bargaining agreements concluded
between associations representing employers and associations representing
employees. The social objectives that social partners pursue when concluding a
collective agreement to improve work and employment conditions would be
15 2
"seriously jeopardized" if the agreement were subject to Article 101(1) TFEU.
Hence, an agreement that is the result of collective bargaining between associations
representing employers and employees, 153 in pursuit of social policy objectives, falls
outside the scope of Article 101 (1) TFEU in light of its virtue and purpose (hereafter,
"the collective bargaining exception"). Two conditions must be satisfied in order for
the collective bargaining exception to apply. First, the agreement must be the
product of collective bargaining between associations representing employers and
employees. Second, the collective
agreement must contribute directly to improving
154
employee working conditions.
Applying these two conditions, the Court came to the conclusion that the
agreements in Albany, Brentjens and Drijvende Bokken fell within the collective
bargaining exception. The collective agreements were the result of negotiations
between associations representing employers and employees. These agreements
contributed directly to improving the working conditions of employees as they were

19
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Should management and labour so desire, the dialogue between them at Union level may lead to
contractual relations, including agreements. 2. Agreements concluded at Union level shall be implemented
either in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the
Member States or, in matters covered by Article 153, at the joint request of the signatory parties, by a
Council decision on a proposal from the Commission. The European Parliament shall be informed."). See,
Albany, EU:C: 1999:430, 59; Brentens, EU:C: 1999:434, 56; Drijvende Bokken, EU:C: 1999:437, 46.
15' Albany, EU:C:1999:430,
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151 In Albany, Brentyens and Drijvende Bokken, the Court used the term "workers".
A year later, in
the Pavlov case the Court used the phrase in paragraph 68, "... in the context of collective bargaining
between employers and employees" (a more narrow term; emphasis added). Pavlov and Others v.
Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten, Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, EU:C:2000:428,
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concluded to guarantee a specific pension level for all employees in a sector.155
According to Advocate-General Wahl in his opinion in FNV Kunsten Informatie en
Media, matters that fall within the phrase "directly improving working and
employment conditions" include, at the very least, remuneration, working hours,
annual leave, pensions, insurance and health care. 156
In Pavlov, the Court of Justice emphasized that the criteria of the collective
bargaining exception were to be applied conjunctively, not disjunctively. In Pavlov,
the medical specialists' profession represented by the National Association of
Specialists of the Royal Netherlands Society for the Promotion of Medicine
(hereafter, "NAS") decided to set up an occupational pension scheme. At NAS's
request, the Minister for Social Affairs made membership in the scheme
compulsory. 157 Pavlov and four other medical specialists argued that compulsory
membership in the pension fund was contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU. 158 The Court
decided that, although the agreement had the objective of improving working
conditions of all members of a profession, the agreement was not exempted from the
scope of Article 101 (1) TFEU because it was not concluded within the framework of
collective bargaining between associations representing employers and
employees. 159 A decision taken by an association representing members of a liberal
profession to set up a pension fund does not fall within the scope of the collective
bargaining exception if the decision is unilaterally imposed rather than collectively
negotiated. 160
The Court of Justice was presented with a new aspect of exceptions to Article
10 1(1) TFEU in FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media:161 whether minimum fees for
the self-employed, adopted in a collective bargaining agreement, are immune from
Article 101(1) TFEU. The main point of debate focused directly on the validity of a
provision in a collective bargaining agreement: requiring that employers pay
minimum fees to any self-employed individual with whom they contract.
The case arose from the market for musicians. Dutch orchestras enter into
employer-employee agreements with their permanent staff but the orchestras maintain
a pool of substitutes who are deployed if members of the permanent staff are unable
to work. The substitutes either work on the basis of an employment agreement or are
self-employed. Two Dutch Musician's unions (namely, FNV and the Netherlands
Musicians' Union) representing employees and the self-employed entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with the Association of Foundations for Substitutes

155 Albany, EU:C:1999:430,

7 61 64; Brentens, EU:C:1999:434, TT 58 61; Drijvende Bokken,
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156Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v. The Netherlands, Case
C-413/13, EU:C:2014:2215, 72.
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158Id. 46.
159Id. 68.
160 Id.
70. The Court subsequently established that the medical specialists were undertakings when
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undertakings.
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in Dutch Orchestras (an employers' association) in 2006.162 The agreement contained
a provision fixing minimum fees for self-employed substitutes. Employers bound by
the agreement were obliged to pay the self-employed they retained the rehearsal and
concert fees negotiated for employed substitutes plus an additional sixteen percent.
Upon learning of the contract provision, the Dutch Competition Authority published a
reflection document. 163 The Competition Authority concluded that minimum fees for
the self-employed adopted in a collective bargaining agreement are not covered by the
collective bargaining exception, and may therefore be contrary to Article 101(1)
TFEU. 164 In light of the reflection document, the social partners did not renew the
minimum fee provision. 165 Nonetheless, the FNV brought a civil claim before the
District Court of The Hague seeking a declaration that the minimum fee provision in
the collective agreement was not contrary to Dutch or EU competition law. 166 The
District Court concluded that the collective bargaining exception was not applicable
because the stipulation of minimum fees did not directly improve the employment
and working conditions of employees.'
On appeal, the Court of Appeal of The
Hague held in a preliminary ruling that the self-employed substitutes were
undertakings but stayed
the proceeding pending referral to the Court of Justice for
1 68
preliminary questions.'
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EU:C:2014:2215, 9.
167 Rb's-Gravenhage 27 oktober 2010, Jar 2011, 8 M Nt. (Neth.), TT 4.6 4.7, 4.9. See also FNV
Kunsten Informatie en Media, EU:C:2014:2411, 13.
16' FNV Kunsten Informatie
en Media v. Netherlands,

Hof Den Haag,

July

9,

2013,

NL:GHDHA:2013:5381
(Neth.), TT 3.6 3.8. See also FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media,
EU:C:2014:2411, TT 15 16; Op. Advoc. Gen., FNVKunsten Informatie en Media, EU:C:2014:2215, 12.
The preliminary questions put to the Court read:
Must the competition rules of EU law be interpreted as meaning that a provision in
a collective labour agreement concluded between associations of employers and
associations of employees, which provides that self-employed persons who, on the
basis of a contract for professional services, perform the same work for an employer
as the employees who come within the scope of that collective labour agreement
must receive a specific minimum fee, falls outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU,
specifically on the ground that that provision occurs in a collective labour
agreement? If the answer to the first question is in the negative, does that provision
then fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU in the case where that provision is
(also) intended to improve the working conditions of the employees who come
within the scope of the collective labour agreement, and is it also relevant in that
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The Court of Justice's decision rested on the general rule formulated in Albany,
Brentjens, and Drijvende Bokken. 169 The Court pointed out that service providers,
including the self-employed substitutes, are, in principle, undertakings within the
meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. 17 They offer their services for remuneration on
the market. If an association representing employees negotiates on behalf of, and in
the interest of the self-employed, then the organization does not act as a social
partner-it acts as an association of undertakings for competition law purposes. 171 If
so, the collective agreement is not the result of collective negotiations between
organizations representing employers and employees; the agreement is therefore not
covered by the collective bargaining exception. 172If, however, the service providers
are in reality "false self-employed," then the collective agreement is concluded by
social partners.17 3 "False self-employed" are service providers who are in a position
comparable (if not equivalent) to that of employees. Instead of determining their
conduct on the market independently and bearing any attendant financial or
commercial risk, the false self-employed work under subordination.174 The core
indicator of a subordinate relation is whether the worker is limited in his or her
freedom to choose the time, place and content of his or her work.17 5 The Court
concluded that the provision laying down minimum fees directly contributed to
176
improving the employment and working conditions of the substitutes , i but
remanded to the referring court to decide if the self-employed were, in fact, false
self-employed. The Court of Appeals of The Hague determined that the selfemployed substitutes are false self-employed within the meaning of the decision of
the Court of Justice and ruled that the stipulation of minimum fees177fall "by reason of
its nature and purpose" outside the scope of Article 101 (1) TFEU.
What are the general lessons of FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media? First, the
Court uses a realist conception of employee when applying the collective bargaining
exception. The formal designations of an employee and employer and of a principal
and self-employed are immaterial.178 If a service provider is in a position of
subordination akin (or equivalent) to an employee, an association representing
employees may act on behalf of, and in the interest of, that service provider
without losing its status as a social partner.
The FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media ruling contains, however, a critical
ambiguity: Did the Court, by introducing the concept of the false self-employed,
regard whether those working conditions are thereby improved directly or only
indirectly?"
Request for Preliminary Ruling from the Gerechtshof Den Haag, July 22, 2013, Kunsten Informatie en
Media, EU:C:2014:241 1.
169FNVKunsten Informatie en Media, EU:C:2014:241 1,
22 23.
10 Id. T 27.
1
71 d. TT 28 30.
172Id. 30.
173Id. 31.
174FNVKunsten Informatie en Media, EU:C:2014:241 1, 33.
175Id. 37.
176Id. 39.
177 FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v. Netherlands, Hof Den Haag, NL:GHDHA:2015:2305, 242
(Neth.),
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171Cf. American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 106 (1968).
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mean to create a new category of economic actor, or did the Court instead intend
merely to prevent abusive misclassification by emphasizing that courts should
examine in a realist way whether an actor is an employee or is self-employed? The
thrust of the Court's reasoning appears not to give a novel definition of the false selfemployed but rather appears to give indicators that distinguish between undertakings
and employees. In presenting those indicators, the Court appears to have taken a
certain jurisprudential stance namely, a realist mode of interpretation and
therefore has set aside the actor-in-question's formal designation for "tax,
administrative or organisational reasons. 179 This suggests that, with pragmatic
intentions and by giving no weight to formalities, the Court meant to prevent the
circumvention of employees' employment protection. The decisive inquiry for the
Court is therefore the realist determination of whether the service provider is a
subordinate of the employer.
Even if this realist reading of FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media is correct, it
still leaves unanswered the question of how the Court of Justice would deal with a
situation in which minimum fees for the self-employed are adopted in a collective
bargaining agreement negotiated by an employees' association that does not bargain
on behalf and in the interest of self-employed. That is, how would the Court rule
when the association of employees, in bargaining for the minimum fees of the selfemployed, is deemed to act as social partner by virtue of acting solely in the interest
of the employees?
The crucial questions that still remain undecided by the Court of Justice are
whether minimum fees for the self-employed directly improve the working and
employment conditions of the employee, and whether the association of employees,
in fixing minimum fees for the self-employed, must intend to achieve that
improvement. Advocate General Wahl put such fees within the scope of the
collective bargaining exception if their aim was to prevent what Europeans dub
"social dumping" or what in US jurisprudence is called the "race to the bottom" or
"injurious competition" in the labor market.1 80 AG Wahl rightly opines that
minimum fees for the self-employed may improve the competitive position of
employees. If the difference in costs between employees and the self-employed is
reduced, employment for employees may be safeguarded the point mentioned
above. But protection of employment also prevents the erosion of the right to
collective bargaining. When the number of employees within a profession or sector
diminishes relative to the number of self-employed, collective bargaining becomes
increasingly vulnerable to a vicious circle of disempowerment.
In light of the social policy the EU espouses, including the aspiration for high
quality jobs and the importance of social dialogue, the arguments put forward by AG
Wahl are compelling. For those reasons, minimum fees in a collective bargaining
agreement should be upheld through the Court's affirmation of the collective
bargaining exception in the case of social dumping. The Court could operationalize
this principle by requiring social partners, when invoking the collective bargaining
exception, to show that within a designated recent or future time frame: (i)
179FNVKunsten Informatie en Media, EU:C:2014:241 1, 36.
1. Op. AG Wahl, FNVKunsten Informatie en Media, EU:C:2014:2215,

74 79.
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employees have been or would be substantially replaced by the self-employed, or (ii)
the wages or other working conditions of employees have been or would be, as a
result, substantially diminished. 181
The above discussion of potentially successful invocation of U-turn 1 gave
examples in the architecture, construction, health-care, taxi, and port-trucking
sectors that are also relevant here. Promoting the norms of the proper practice of an
occupation (U-turn 1) is likely to sustain employees' wages, working conditions, and
employment (U-turn 2). However, as discussed below, it is in principle possible that
one strategy could be satisfied while the other is not.
The most transparent way to provide a collective-bargaining exemption for
minimum fees for the self-employed in certain sectors is by introducing a system
through which the Commission grants advance approval. Alternatively, a general
exemption comparable to the block exemption rules could be introduced. Social
partners could thereby anticipate whether the negotiation of minimum fees would
run afoul of competition law.
In conclusion, U-turn 2 could provide legal space to collectively establish
minimum fees for the self-employed, drawing on the familiar, long-accepted legal
principle of avoiding "injurious" competition in the labor market. Everything
depends, however, on the relative weight the Court of Justice ultimately gives to the
well-settled but fairly abstract principles of "EU social policy," and whether the
Court stands ready to operationalize that policy in the name of averting social
dumping between the employed and self-employed segments of the labor market.
The discussion of U-turn 4, infra, introduces new concepts that would effectively
mitigate the indeterminacy of balancing social and economic policy, in order to
uphold collective agreements setting minimum fees in response to injurious
competition.
C.

U-turn 3: The Government Takes the Wheel

A blunt U-turn would entail national governments' putting in place a system of
compulsory minimum fees or fee scales. European competition law refers to the
conduct of undertakings, not to the conduct of legislative or executive officials.
Hence, legislation or regulations adopted by the Member States do not, as a strictly
textual matter,' fall within the scope of the prohibitions of Articles 101 and 102
TFEU.

1"1 More ambitiously, the Court of Justice could also extend the collective bargaining exception to

the situation where, in the face of competition between the self-employed and employees, the association
intends to improve working and employment conditions of either the self-employed or the employees.
The fourth U-turn develops concepts that, if adopted by the Court of Justice, would implement this
ambition. See infra Part IV(D).
1.. A Member State must navigate competition rules when it confers a special or exclusive right
upon undertakings. Article 106(1) TFEU prohibits Member States to enact or maintain any measure
contrary to inter alia Articles 101 and 102 TFEU when it grants a special or exclusive right to an
undertaking.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW

[VOL 22.2

Member States are, however, obliged to adhere to the general principle of
sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU. 183 When Article 4(3) TEU is read
in conjunction with Article 101 (1) TFEU, it is the duty of the Member States "not to
introduce or maintain in force measures . . . which may render ineffective the
competition rules."'1 84 A Member State acts contrary to Article 4(3) TEU and Article
101(1) TFEU when it: (i) "requires or encourages the adoption of agreements,
decisions, or concerted practices contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU"; (ii) "reinforces
their effects"; or (iii) deprives "its own legislation of its official character by
delegating to private
traders responsibility for taking decisions affecting the
'1 85
economic sphere."
Thus, the principle of sincere cooperation requires Member States not to
legitimize or facilitate anticompetitive conduct of undertakings, and associations of
undertakings, contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU. 1 86 A government acts, for example,
contrary to the principle of sincere cooperation if it declares generally binding a
trade agreement that includes a provision stipulating the levying of a payment when
an enterprise produces more than the established quota for in one leading case
Cognac spirits.1 87 The same applies to a government requirement that, should airline
companies or their trade organizations wish to impose a tariff, they must submit the
tariff for approval by the Minister for Civil Aviation. 188 The crux of the latter
ruling in the Asjes case is that although enterprises are not encouraged or forced
by the government to collectively establish tariffs, the legal requirement does
contemplate ministerial approval of tariffs coordinated by trade organizations.
While governments need to respect the principle of sincere cooperation, the
threshold for non-compliance is quite high. 189 It is therefore not very likely that a
Member State acts contrary to the principle of sincere cooperation when the state
itself adopts a fee scale.190 For example, the core question in the Italian case Arduino
was whether a Member State acts contrary to Articles 4(3) TEU and 101(1) TFEU

1'

TEU Art. 4(3) ("Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member

States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties.
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the
obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The
Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which

could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives.").
114 See, e.g., Van Eycke v. ASPA NV, Case 267/86, EU:C:1988:427,
16; Bundesanstalt for den
Gtiterfernverkehr v. Gebrtider Reiff GmbH & Co. KG., Case C-185/91, EU:C:1993:886,
14 [hereinafter
Reiff]; Arduino, Case C-35/99, EU:C:2001:398, 34; Maui v. Ministero della Giustizia, Case C-250/03,
EU:C:2005:96, 29; Cipolla, EU:C:2006:758, 46; Sbarigia v. Azienda USL RM/A and Others, Case C393/08, EU:C:2010:388, 31; Case C-327/12, Ministero dello Sviluppo economico and Autoritd v. SOA
Nazionale Costruttori, Case C-327/12, EU:C:2013:827, 37.
1" See, e.g., Van Eycke, EU:C:1988:427,
16; Reiff, EU:C:1993:886, 14; Arduino, EU:C:2002:97,
35; Mauri, EU:C:2005:96,
30; Cipolla, EU:C:2006:758,
47; SOA Nazionale Costruttori,
EU:C:2013:827, 38.
1 6 Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, Reiff, EU:C: 1993:309,
40.
17 Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac v. Aubert, Case 136/86, EU:C: 1987:524,
25.
1.. Ministere public v. Asjes & Others, Joint Cases 209/84-213/84, EU:C: 1986:188, TT 76-77.
1"9 See supra note 18 5 for full list of requirements.
190 SOA Nazionale Costruttori,EU:C:2013:827, T 39.

MINIMUM FEES FOR THE SELF-EMPLOYED

2016]

when it sets, by ministerial decree, mandatory
minimum and maximum fees for
1 91
members of the Italian Bar Association.
The Court held that, although the Italian State conferred upon the National
Council of the Bar the obligation to draft minimum and maximum fees payable to
members of the Bar, the Italian State did not delegate the responsibility for taking
decisions affecting the economic sphere (such as declaring generally binding fees) to
a private economic operator (such as the National Council of the Bar). 192 In short,
the third condition above was not violated. Applying the first condition, the Court
concluded that the Italian State neither required nor encouraged the adoption of a
decision of an association of undertakings contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU.
The Court gave the Italian State such wide berth by reasoning that the
government neither waived its "power to make decisions of the last resort" nor
encouraged the adoption of a decision contrary to Article 101 (1) TFEU. 193 Although
the National Council of the Bar was obliged to produce draft fees, they became
binding only upon ministerial approval. Moreover, the Minister retained authority to
amend the proposals of the National Council. Finally, the Italian courts had ultimate
authority to determine fees in individual cases based on fixed criteria adopted by
royal decree.
In the Reiff case,1 94 the dispute was over tariffs fixed by boards in the
transportation sector.1 95 The tariff board was composed of experts of particular
branches; and the experts were appointed by the Minister of Transport on the
recommendation of undertakings and associations operating in that sector. The
governing law obligated the members to act independently and in an honorable
manner. The tariffs became binding only upon approval by the Minister. 19 6 The
Minister was authorized to adjust the fee scales presented by the tariff board, but
only if required by the public interest.
In its decision, the Court found no indication of an agreement or a decision
contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU (the first condition above). 197 First, the members of
the tariff board were experts within the transport sector and acted independently of
the pertinent undertakings and trade associations. The experts were therefore not
representatives of the undertakings; the board did not resemble a trade organization
serving the interests of its members. Moreover, the tariff board was required, when
setting the fee scales, to take into account wider interests such as the those of the
agricultural sector, small and medium-sized enterprises, and economically
disadvantaged regions. Also, the board was required to obtain advice from a
committee consisting of representatives of the users of the services. Finally, the
Court found that the government did not delegate its power to fix tariffs to private

191Arduino, EU:C:2002:97,

7 18, 32.
Id. 43.
19 Id. TT 40-42. See also, Cipolla, EU:C:2006:758, TT 49-53.
194 Reiff EU:C: 1993:886,
4.
195 Id. 4.
192

96

1

197

Id. 76.
Id. TT 15-19.
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economic operators (the third condition). 198 This was evidenced by the fact that the
Minister had the authority to set up the tariff boards, appoint their members, attend
their meetings, and modify the tariffs in the public interest.
The room to maneuver for governments when setting the fees of the selfemployed is, so it seems, quite generous. The most important criteria are that
governments retain the ultimate power to make decisions affecting the economic
sphere and not legitimize anticompetitive behavior of undertakings.
Direct government setting of the self-employed's fees must also respect the free
199
movement principles, one of the "fundamental freedoms" enshrined in the TFEU.
The fundamental freedoms were introduced in the Treaty of Rome and are among
the pillars of European economic integration. They are founded on the principle of
non-discrimination. 200 Member States must ensure that imported goods, services,
people and capital of other Member States are treated equally with their domestic
equivalents. The principles of free movement are in principle addressed to the
Member States, in contrast to the competition rules. Consequently, the freedom of
establishment 2°1 and the freedom to provide services 2°2 are hurdles to Member States
in fixing fees for self-employed.
The SOA Nazionale Construttori case addressed the compatibility of the
competition rules and the fundamental freedoms. At issue was the validity of fee
scales set by the Italian government for certification bodies that implemented
procurement procedures. 203 The Court quickly dispatched the question whether the
tariff scale agreed with the principle of sincere cooperation, holding that the Italian
government had not delegated its power to private economic operators and did not
encourage or reinforce agreements or decisions contrary to Article 10 1(1) TFEU.2 °4
19
99

1

Id.

7 20-23.

See, Op. Advoc. Gen. Reiff, C-185/91, EU:C:1993:309, TT 60-77

In the late 90's, to remove obstacles to free movement, the Court of Justice developed the

00.

"market access test," a more far-reaching concept than the principle of non-discrimination. For example,
in Gebhard (Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine deglli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, Case C-55/94,
EU:C:1995:411) an Italian case about the use of the title 'avvocato', the Court held that the pertinent
Italian provision was "liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms
guaranteed by the treaty." The Court here took a more progressive approach with respect to market
integration than was possible using the concept of non-discrimination.
.01TFEU art. 49 ("Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom
of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be
prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or
subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member State. Freedom
of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set
up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph
of Article 54, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such
establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.").
0..TFEU art. 56 ("Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on freedom to
provide services within the Union shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are
established in a Member State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended. The
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may
extend the provisions of the Chapter to nationals of a third country who provide services and who are
established within the Union.").
0..
SOA Nazionale Costruttori,EU:C:2013:827, TT 18, 25.
0
2 4 Id. 739.
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The Court found, however, that the compulsory minimum tariffs encroach on
the freedom of establishment. 205 Minimum tariffs made it less attractive for
undertakings established in another Member State to enter the certification market in
Italy. When tariffs are fixed undertakings from other EU countries cannot lower their
tariffs to advance their competitive position and are thereby deprived of a tool to
effectively compete with domestic undertakings that occupy a secure market niche.
However, measures in violation of Article 49 TFEU may be justified on the basis of
the public interest. 2°6 The Italian government intended to protect the independence of
the certification bodies and ensure the quality of their services by fixing their tariffs.
The Court found that fixing tariffs was a suitable means to protect the quality of
services and thereby to protect the recipients of the services because: the government
was attempting to remove financial incentives that cut against the impartial and nondiscriminatory behavior of the bodies when granting certifications, the certification
bodies were permitted to carry out only certification activities, and they were
required to have sufficient resources to carry out their activities in good faith.
The remaining question whether the minimum fee scheme is a "proportionate
measure" to protect the interests of the customers of the certification bodies was
for the referring court to decide on remand.20 7
The Italian government's fixing of fee scales for members of the Bar was at
issue again in Cipolla. But the referring court now raised a preliminary question
about the compatibility of the fixed tariff scales with the freedom of
establishment. 208 Here, the Court of Justice stressed that the prohibition against
derogation from the fixed tariffs restricted the freedom of establishment. 209 Just as in
SOA Nazionale Construttori, the Court held that access to the Italian legal services
market was hampered by the prohibition because lawyers from other Member States
could not, by lowering their tariffs, improve their competitive position vis-A-vis
Italian lawyers. The question that followed was whether the restriction of the
freedom of establishment could be justified. 2 The Court confirmed that public
interest objectives like consumer protection and the proper administration of justice
could justify laws that would otherwise violate Article 49 TFEU. The particular
characteristics of the legal services market were relevant to that justification. The
competition among practicing lawyers was fierce, in light of their large numbers.
Lawyers who offered discounts to bind clients raised the danger of degrading the
quality of legal services. The familiar information asymmetry between clients and
lawyers was, according to the Court, also a significant distinguishing feature; it is
difficult for clients to evaluate the quality of services provided. The Court held that it
was for the referring court to decide whether there existed a correlation between
legal fees and quality of services, and therefore whether fee-setting was an
211
appropriate consumer-protection measure.
o15
Id.

7 57 58. See also, Cipolla, EU:C:2006:758,
58 60.
SOA Nazionale Costruttori,EU:C:2013:827, TT 61 65.
1o7 Id. TT 66 68.
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What are the lessons of these precedents? An important element in deciding
whether a Member State acts contrary to the principle of sincere cooperation by
failing to adhere to competition rules is with whom the initiative for the restrictive
behavior lies. If the government puts a stamp on a restrictive agreement between
undertakings for example, in the form of declaring an otherwise private agreement
generally binding and thereby legitimizes the collusive behavior, then the
government acts contrary to the principle of sincere cooperation. In contrast, if the
government itself sets, and maintains the ultimate authority to adjust, fees, then the
government's actions will generally satisfy the principle of sincere cooperation. In
the Asjes case, the Court concluded that the government legitimized tariffs already
coordinated by trade organizations. The result in Arduino is rightly different because
the proposal of the National Council of the Bar was only referred to the government
and did not have any binding force. Although, in Reiff, the government seemed to
have less room to deviate from the draft fees put forward by the tariff board, the
board members were independent experts charged with serving general interests. In
the case of fees or tariffs proposed or set by an independent body, the most important
criterion to avoid violating condition (i) or (ii) is that the body be unrelated to
undertakings or associations of the respective branch or sector. Indicators of the
body's independence are the professional background of its members and a mandate
that it serve general interests when setting fees. To avoid violating condition (iii), the
dominant criterion is the government's ultimate power to adopt the fee scales in
question.
Hence, from a competition law perspective governments have great leeway in
fixing fee scales. When doing so, however, governments must act carefully to not
run afoul of the free movement principles. Action that would otherwise violate these
principles can be justified however if the Court finds that the action has the objective
of safeguarding public interests. Based on the case law, governments may set fees of
the self-employed upon a careful showing that the fees serve public interests, such as
safeguarding the quality of services, protecting consumers, maintaining health and
safety standards, or promoting the interests of wider groups beyond the occupation
in question.
The examples of various occupations that might enjoy the protections of U-turn
1 and U-turn 2 architects, construction workers, health-care workers, taxi drivers,
and port truckers are also candidates for fee-setting that satisfies U-turn 3, even
though the rationales of these three U-turns are different, at least in the Court's
doctrinal rhetoric. Recall that under U-turn 1, the association must prove that
minimum fees directly promote the proper practice of the occupation-a functional
inquiry about the nature of the occupation. Under U-turn 2 (assuming the Court were
to use the existing doctrinal leeway to uphold fee-setting to avert injurious
competition) the union of employees must prove that, by avoiding social dumping,
minimum fees of the self-employed will sustain employees' wages and other
working conditions. Under U-turn 3, the government must prove that fee-setting
serves some wider social interest.
The factual proof in all three cases is manifestly overlapping, though not
identical. While U-turn 1 requires a showing that minimum fees directly promote the
proper practice of the occupation, U-turn 2 requires proof of the narrower point that
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minimum fees benefit employees' wages, working conditions, or employment. If Uturn 1 is satisfied, then it is likely that a claim under U-turn 2 would a fortiori
succeed. Nonetheless, as an analytic matter, U-turn 2 may not be entirely subsumed
within U-turn 1. That is, it is theoretically possible that the promotion of
occupational norms would in some instances redound not to the benefit of employees
themselves (or to the benefit of the self-employed) but entirely to the benefit of
third-parties, such as legal clients who are able to put greater trust in their attorneys,
or local communities that are relieved of truck pollution that does not affect the
drivers.
U-turn 3 focuses full-bloodedly on the public interest benefits to consumers,
other third parties, and the general public although, as just noted, proof of a claim
under U-turn 1 will often focus on benefits to third parties as well. Indeed, even
though proof of a claim under U-turn 2 requires evidence only of self-interested
benefits to employees, that claim rests, as a jurisprudential matter, on the somewhat
broader notion of avoiding injurious competition that, in turn, is grounded in the still
wider principles of European social policy, such as enhancing social dialogue,
equality, and macro-economic stability.
Note that none of these three U-turns squarely encourages solidaristic action
between employees and the self-employed. That is, they are not strategies designed
to directly encourage "self-reflexive" governance in the sense of enabling private
norm-setting by means of weakening labor-market segmentation among all members
of the occupation or profession even if each of the three strategies may, depending
on the context, provide indirect incentives for such combined action. U-turn 4 is
more ambitious and transformative, both in the sense that it seeks directly to mitigate
labor-market segmentation and in the sense that it encourages the Court of Justice to
adopt new concepts to do that jurisprudential job.
D. U-turn 4: Transplanting the Labor Group, a Concept of the US Supreme
Court
This Article's final proposed strategy for minimum fees U-turn 4 urges the
Court to adopt a new conceptual framework to permit an association that includes
both employees and the self-employed to unilaterally or bilaterally set minimum
fees, in the interest of both employees and the self-employed. The new conceptual
framework is consistent with fundamental principles of EU Treaties and, equally
important, would adapt the Court of Justice's doctrine to the realities of the
contemporary labor market. The logic of U-turn 4 would also respond decisively to
the unanswered question posed by U-turn 2: Collective agreements setting minimum
fees should not violate competition law if, in response to social dumping, the social
partners negotiate not in the exclusive interest of the self-employed, but rather in the
interests of both employees and the self-employed.
U-turn 4 is inspired by US case law. In the US, unilateral actions of a union are
in principle exempted from the antitrust laws if the union acts in its self-interest and
does not combine with non-labor groups. 212 The scope of this so-called labor
1'
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exemption was addressed in the landmark Carroll decision.
The dispute focused
on the fact that the American Federation of Musicians required orchestra leaders to
charge their clients minimum prices. The musicians' union unilaterally adopted these
minimum fees in its bylaws and regulations, pressured orchestra leaders to join the
union, and imposed the fee requirement on the orchestra leaders on the sole basis of
their union membership. The question for the Supreme Court was whether the selfemployed orchestra leaders notwithstanding that they were employers and
independent contractors 214 qualified as a "labor group" with which the rank-andfile musician-employees could lawfully combine in the context of a "labor
dispute., 215 The Court concluded that the self-employed orchestra leaders were
indeed a "labor group" and were implicated in a "labor dispute" since there was "job
or wage competition or some other economic interrelationship affecting legitimate
union interests between the union members and the independent contractors. 2 16
Giving somewhat more specificity to this general rule, the Court further stated that a
union may combine with independent contractors if the "work and function
performed by the independent contractors actually or potentially affect the hours,
wages, job security or working conditions of the union members in the same
industry." The Court concluded that the union had a legitimate interest in fixing the
fees of the self-employed orchestra leaders to protect the wage scales of the
musician-employees; and therefore the latter did not violate the Sherman Act by
collaborating with the former.
A more recent case, decided by the US District Court for the Southern District
of New York, shows the full force of the Carroll precedent, in the context of the
employees and the self-employed who produce content for the media industry a
fact pattern with obvious relevance for the paradigmatic cases of Uber-ized labor
markets, namely, self-employed providers of services to web-based media or to
clients through online intermediaries. In Home Box Office v. Directors Guild of
America, the Directors Guild entered into standardized agreements with several
production companies stipulating the terms on which directors would provide their
services. 217 The Guild then prohibited its members from working at lower rates for
non-signatory production companies, like Home Box Office (HBO). HBO contended

1'

Am. Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 104 (1968). US antitrust law permits a union

that includes both employees and the self-employed to unilaterally set fee scales that are binding on selfemployed members of the union, when those fees affect the employees' wages. However, US antitrust law
prohibits an organization composed exclusively of the self-employed from collectively bargaining with
clients for minimum fees. There are many rules of US labor law that impede employees and the selfemployed from joining together to bargain with clients of the self-employed, even when such bargaining
would not violate US antitrust law. Indeed, under Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, even a
union whose members are exclusively employees is not permitted to reach an agreement with their
employer prohibiting the latter from hiring self-employed entities that fail to receive a specified minimum
fee. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e). There are, however, explicit sectoral exceptions to Section 8(e) for the garment
and construction industries, in which self-employed independent contractors are ubiquitous. In those
sectors, then, a union of employees could lawfully bargain with their employer over the fees of
independent contractors hired by the employer.
1 Carroll v. Am. Fed'n of Musicians, 372 F.2d 155, 159 (1967).
1 Carroll, 391 U.S. at 101.
116 Id. at 106 (affirmatively quoting the District Court decision in Carroll v. Am. Fed'n of Musicians,
241 F.Supp. 865, 887 (1965)).
117 Home Box Off. v. Directors Guild of Am., 531 F.Supp. 578, 581 (1982).
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that some of the freelance-directors, producer-directors and director-packagers
whom the Guild represented were independent contractors; and by collaborating
with and representing them, the Guild violated antitrust laws. The Court held that
even if the freelance-directors, producer-directors, and director-packagers were selfemployed independent contractors, they were nonetheless a "labor group," within the
meaning of the Supreme Court's Carroll decision. 218 Therefore, the Guild could
lawfully prohibit them from working for any production company that did not meet
compensation standards of other production companies. The Court held in particular
that freelance and staff directors perform very similar functions and are to a great
extent interchangeable. They have a mutual interest in bargaining together, since
competition between them would
lead to mutual undercutting of employee wages
219
and the self-employed's fees.
Should the Court of Justice adopt the US concept of "labor group" to better
align competition law with the reality of Uber-ized labor markets and to soften the
undertaking versus employee dichotomy that has dominated the Court's rulings to
date? The Court of Justice has not yet shown itself willing to embrace in-between
categories of workers, lying somewhere between the categories of employee and
undertaking although the Court gestured in that direction by referring to the "false
self-employed" in the Wouters case. The US doctrine points to a viable jurisprudence
for reshaping this rigid duality in response to the negative consequences of
contemporary labor-market configurations.
Certainly, transplanting the US concept would be an aid to unions by allowing
them, in particular contexts, to unilaterally adopt minimum fees for the selfemployed. But such legal migration would serve more than the immediate interests
of unionized employees. It would also serve the interests of the self-employed who
act collectively with those employees. And it would serve the broader public interest
in an era of ever-growing economic and social inequality which, as described in Part
I, is in significant part due to the weakening of employees' bargaining power, which
is in turn due (again, in significant part) to both the weakening of unions and the
outsourcing of work to the self-employed.
This reasoning returns us to the critical question left open by the Court of Justice
in its application of the collective bargaining exemption that is key to the viability
and breadth of U-turn 2.
Recall that in FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media the Court held that if an
association of employees bargains on behalf and in the interest of the self-employed,
the association cannot be deemed a social partner for the purpose of satisfying the
collective bargaining exception. 220 Since the association of employees in FNV
Kunsten Informatie en Media was regulating the behavior of undertakings by setting
minimum fees for self-employed musicians, the association changed color and
became an "association of undertakings" rather than a "social partner" bargaining for
employee wages.
1'
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9 Home Box Office, 531 F.Supp. at 597.
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But the Court's analysis did not address whether an association of employees
loses its status as social partner and becomes an association of undertakings when
the association does not act in the exclusive interest of the self-employed, but rather
acts, concurrently, in the interests of both employees and the self-employed.
If the Court were to address these questions, it would do well to reach across the
Atlantic and transplant the concept of "labor group," and use that concept to uphold
such associational activity. Indeed, the Court should reach that result not only in the
case of an association's unilateral imposition of fees but also in the case of
collectively bargained fees. The same principles of social policy are at stake in both
unilateral and bilateral imposition of minimum fees. Indeed, determination of fees by
collective bargaining is even more concordant with European social policy, in light
of the strong commitment to promoting social dialogue through collective
bargaining.
Indeed, as already discussed with respect to U-turn 2, the Court of Justice
retains the doctrinal leeway to determine that an association of employees and the
self-employed does not lose it status as social partner and convert into an association
of undertakings when a collective agreement sets fees in order to avert social
dumping. If the Court of Justice adopted the concept of "labor group," it could
decisively take the doctrinal position that, in such a case, the association remains a
social partner so long as it constitutes a collaboration between employees and a labor
group comprised of the self-employed that compete with the employees in question.
The US Supreme Court's rationale for that doctrine fits comfortably with the
underpinnings of the Court of Justice's jurisprudence on competition law in the labor
context. Recall that the critical question for the Supreme Court was whether there
exists "job or wage competition or some other economic interrelationship affecting
legitimate union interests between the union members and the independent
contractors.,, 2 2 1 As discussed above, Court of Justice decisions embrace similar
concerns about injurious competition or social dumping. On the basis of those
concerns, the Court of Justice insulates associations of employees from the strictures
of competition law, when the association is acting to protect the wages and working
conditions of employees the precise test for the labor exemption from US antitrust
law, even when a labor union pressures self-employed independent contractors to
join the union and unilaterally stipulates minimum fees of the latter "labor group."
In sum, in the doctrinal language of EU competition law, such collaboration
between employees and the self-employed would not be deemed to convert the union
from a social partner into an association of undertakings. This rule would mesh with
the Court of Justice's fundamental understanding that unions are entitled to their
special privileges as "social partners" when their conduct serves the unions' core
function of effectively bargaining for jobs, wages and working conditions for its
employee members. At the level of higher-order legal principles, such privileges
embody the "social policy" that must be accommodated with the "economic policy"
inhering in the market competition jurisprudence of the Court of Justice.
At the level of hermeneutics, the realist interpretive method embraced by the
1..
Carroll,391
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Court of Justice in its FNVKunsten Informatie en Media ruling suggests that the EU
social policy can and should adapt to the changing realities of the labor market that
is, the reality of "Uber-ization," rooted precisely in the expansion of selfemployment and intensified competition between employees and the self-employed.
The concept of "labor group" might be deployed even more boldly, to permit
unilateral or bilateral fee-setting even by associations whose members are
predominately self-employed at least in contexts where the self-employed meet
certain indicators (to be fashioned by Courts through case-by-case examination of
myriad factual contexts) of subordination in relation to the large corporations who
are their clients. That is, the self-employed who satisfy those indicators would
constitute a "labor group" with equivalent powers and privileges as those of "social
partners," by virtue of the same underpinnings of EU social policy namely, the
policy of preventing injurious competition or social dumping. By way of illustration,
consider the plight of freelance journalists who compete among themselves to obtain
work and compensation from media conglomerates. In light of their exceptionally
weak bargaining power, it is pure formalism to categorize freelance journalists as
"undertakings" with the same legal status as the media giants. If a union consisting
predominantly of the self-employed (together with a minority membership of
employees directly employed by the large media enterprises) were able, by majority
vote, to set minimum fees for journalists, they could earn fees that exceed the level
set now by manifestly "injurious competition."
CONCLUSION
The contemporary labor market is marked by increasing flexibility, including
outsourcing and the frequently concurrent conversion of workers from employees to
the self-employed.
Nowhere is this more visible, and legally and politically
controversial, than in the recent surge of online intermediaries such as Uber, linking
the self-employed to clients while displacing employees subject to labor- and
employment-law protections. But the phenomenon predates, and is much more
widespread than, online freelancing. The data presented in this Article show clearly
that, in many Member States, the self-employed are a large fraction of the
workforce, and the percentage of self-employment is increasing in many states,
especially since the 2008 global financial crisis. The schism between the heavily
protected employee and the largely unprotected self-employed often yields
deterioration in labor standards deterioration that is captured in the European
rubric of "social dumping" and the American concepts of "injurious" or "unfair"
competition." The result is diminished compensation, impaired working conditions,
corroded norms of occupational practice for both employees and the self-employed,
and declension of social dialogue all contributing significantly to the severe
economic inequality that characterizes our "Second Gilded Age." Minimum fees for
the self-employed are one emerging strategy for alleviating these affronts to core
principle of EU social policy.
This Article explored four U-turns that might avert collision between minimum
fees for the self-employed and the strictures of competition law embodied in Article
101(1) TFEU. The first three U-turns take as given the recent jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice. The first strategy U-turn 1 would permit certain
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associations of the self-employed to unilaterally set minimum fees, in cases where
the association could meet the difficult, though not insurmountable, burden of
proving that fee-setting is necessary to maintain proper occupational practices. Uturn 2 discussed the Court of Justice's current doctrine that declines to exempt from
competition-law proscriptions collective agreements that set minimum fees in the
interest of the self-employed. Although the Court has not addressed the case of feesetting when necessary to block social dumping in the labor market, the Court's
existing doctrine does not foreclose such a ruling. The third strategy direct
government mandate of fee scales is a promising U-turn under the Court's current
jurisprudence, so long as Member States are sufficiently careful to navigate the
Court's doctrinal requirements that official fee-setting bodies maintain independence
from self-interested associations of the self-employed and act in the public interest.
The most ambitious strategy U-turn 4 urges the Court of Justice to adopt the
US Supreme Court's concept of "labor group," an intermediate category that
acknowledges the obsolescence of the rigid employee-undertaking dichotomy. This
new conceptual framework which would permit an association that includes both
employees and the self-employed to unilaterally or collectively set minimum fees in
the interest of both groups is consistent with fundamental principles of EU Treaties
and, equally important, would adapt the Court's conceptual scheme to the realities of
the contemporary labor market. This jurisprudential innovation would therefore
concord with the Court of Justice's recent turn to a strongly realist method of
interpretation. The logic of U-turn 4 would also respond to the unanswered question
posed by U-turn 2: Collective agreements setting minimum fees should not violate
competition law if the social partners negotiate in the interest of both employees and
the self-employed and not exclusively in the interests of the self-employed.
Whether social actors will gain the opportunity to wield the tool of minimum
fees to humanize Uber-ized work turns on the relative weight given accepted core
principles of European social policy under existing EU Treaties. The answer
therefore lies in the hands of the Court of Justice.

